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Abstract
This Comment discusses the ramifications that Weltover has had on the decisions of federal
circuit and district courts. Part I examines the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, its history,
and its “commercial activity exception.” Part I then proceeds to describe Argentina’s commercial
activity at issue in Weltover, and the events in Argentina that created the conflict that led to the
Weltover decision. Part II traces Weltover’s procedural history, first describing the decisions by
both the district court and the court of appeals, and then presenting the decision by the Supreme
Court. In addition, Part II reviews a sampling of the federal circuit and district court cases that
have followed Weltover’s holding. Part III argues that the Weltover decision is significant because
it provides lower courts with a standard to follow for defining the “direct effect” requirement of
the commercial activity exception. Part III also notes that, despite the guidance that the Supreme
Court has given through Weltover, the issue of a sovereign’s protection under the FSIA remains
unresolved. This Comment concludes that Weltover presents an important decision in the law of
sovereign immunity, however, the question of the scope of the Weltover holding remains unsettled.
REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA v. WELTOVER, INC.:
INTERPRETING THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY ACT'S COMMERCIAL
ACTIVITY EXCEPTION TO
JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITY
INTRODUCTION
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (the "FSIA") pro-
vides the exclusive statutory method for U.S. courts to obtain ju-
risdiction over a non-U.S. sovereign.' The FSIA also offers a do-
mestic forum for disputes arising from business transactions be-
tween non-U.S. sovereigns and persons in the United States. 2
More significantly, the FSIA immunizes non-U.S. states, their
political subdivisions, and their agencies and instrumentalities
from jurisdiction of U.S. courts unless one of several listed ex-
ceptions applies.' The U.S. Supreme Court has characterized
1. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891, (codi-
fied at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2)-(4), 1391(f), 1441(d) (1988), 1602-1611 (1988 &
Supp. IV 1992). The FSIA was enacted on October 21, 1976 and became effective 90
days thereafter. Richard W. Cutler, Commercial Exception to Foreign Sovereign Immunity,
N.Y. L.J., May 3, 1993, at I [hereinafter Commercial Exception]. Richard W. Cutler, a solo
practitioner in New York, was the attorney who represented the plaintiffs in Republic of
Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2160 (1992), the subject of this Comment.
2. Lorna G. Schofield, Note, Effects Jurisdiction Under Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
and the Due Process Clause, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 474, 474 (1980) [hereinafter Effects Jurisdic-
tion].
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1605. Section 1605(a) reads as follows:
General exceptions to the jurisdictional immunity of a foreign state
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the
United States or of the States in any case-
(1) in which the foreign state has waived its immunity either explicitly or
by implication, notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver which the for-
eign state may purport to effect except in accordance with the terms of the
waiver;
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in
the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United
States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere;
or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct
effect in the United States;
(3) in which rights in property taken in violation of international law are
in issue and that property or any property exchanged for such property is
present in the United States in connection with a commercial activity carried
on in the United States by the foreign state; or that property or any property
exchanged for such property is owned or operated by an agency or instrumen-
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the "commercial activity" exception as the most significant one.4
This exception provides the framework in which a party can
maintain a lawsuit against a non-U.S. sovereign or its entities in a
U.S. court.'
On June 12, 1992, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Republic
of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.,6 and interpreted the "commercial
activity" exception in an effort to resolve what, in fact, constitutes
a "commercial activity."7 In Weltover, the Court held that a sover-
tality of the foreign state and that agency or instrumentality is engaged in a
commercial activity in the United States;
(4) in which rights in property in the United States acquired by succes-
sion or gift or rights in immovable property situated in the United States are in
issue;
(5) not otherwise encompassed in paragraph (2) above, in which money
damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death, or
damages to or loss of property, occurring in the United States and caused by
the tortious act or omission of that foreign state or of any official or employee
of that foreign state while acting within the scope of his office or employment;
except this paragraph shall not apply to-
(a) any claim based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function regardless of whether the discre-
tion be abused, or
(b) any claim arising out of malicious prosecution, abuse of process, li-
bel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights; or
(6) in which the action is brought, either to enforce an agreement made
by the foreign state with or for the benefit of a private party to submit to
arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or which may arise be-
tween the parties with respect to a defined legal relationship, whether contrac-
tual or not, concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration
under the laws of the United States, or to confirm an award made pursuant to
such an agreement to arbitrate, if (A) the arbitration takes place or is in-
tended to take place in the Unites States, (B) the agreement or award is or
may be governed by a treaty or other international agreement in force for the
United States calling for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards,
(C) the underlying claim, save for the agreement to arbitrate, could have been
brought in a United States court under this section or section 1607, or (D)
paragraph (1) of this subsection is otherwise inapplicable.
28 U.S.C. § 1605. Section 1605(b)-(d) involves suits in admiralty and is therefore irrele-
vant to this Comment. The most significant portion of the above section vis-a-vis this
Comment is 1605(a) (2), the "commercial activity" section.
4. See, Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., - U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 2160, 2164
(1992) ("The most significant of the FSIA's exceptions ... is the 'commercial' excep-
tion .. ..").
5. H.R. REP'. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6604 [hereinafter HoUSE REPORT].
6. 112 S. Ct. 2160 (1992).
7. See, e.g., Antares Aircraft v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, - U.S. -, 112 S. C .
3020 (1992) (vacating judgment and remanding to United States Court of Appeals for
Second Circuit for further consideration in light of Weltover;, Chuidian v. Philippine
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eign's issuance of bonds8 was an act taken "in connection with a
commercial activity."9 In addition, the Court held that a non-
U.S. sovereign's unilateral rescheduling of the bonds had a "di-
rect effect in the United States" so as to subject it to suit in a U.S.
court pursuant to the FSIA. 1°
Previously, lower courts lacked uniformity in their decisions
on whether a sovereign's actions constituted "commercial activ-
ity."11 As a result, courts were unable to develop a single inter-
Nat'l Bank, 976 F.2d 561, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (dissenting opinion) (following Weltover by
saying that "the place of payment is usually considered the place of performance in
analogous situations."); Walter Fuller Aircraft Sales, Inc. v. Republic of Philippines, 965
F.2d 1375, 1387, (5th Cir. 1992) (noting that "Weltover strengthens our conclu-
sion.... ."); Federal Ins. Co. v. Richard I. Rubin & Co., Inc., No. 924177, 1993 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 784, at *24 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 1993) (concluding that the court could exercise
subject matter jurisdiction based upon the commercial activity exception of the FSIA);
Drexel Burnham Lambert Group Inc. v. A.W. Galadari, 810 F. Supp. 1375, 1385-86
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (relying on Weltover for its interpretation of FSIA's commercial activity
exception); AMPAC Group Inc. v. Republic of Honduras, 797 F. Supp. 973, 976-77
(S.D. Fla. 1992) (noting that the "very recent Supreme Court decision of Republic of
Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.... disposes of the issue [and]... provides guidance"); First
City, Texas-Houston, N.A. v. Rafidian Bank, No. 90 Civ. 7360, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15235, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 1992) (relying on Weltover for its statement that
"Rafidian Bank's actions were purely commercial in nature. As such, it cannot claim
sovereign immunity for its acts.").
8. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 1201, 1203. These bonds,
known as "Bonods," provided that the Argentinean government would pay the bond-
holders in U.S. dollars. Id.
9. Weltover, 112 S. Ct. at 2168.
10. Id.; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611.
11. See, e.g., CHARLES J. LEwis, STATE AND DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY 44-46, 86-87 (3d
ed. 1990) (giving examples of various cases in which courts ambiguously reached deci-
sions as to commerciality). It was not uncommon for courts to reach different conclu-
sions as to an act's commerciality on fact patterns which did not possess any factors to
merit logical distinction. Id. at 44-46. For example, in de Sanchez v. Banco Central de
Nicaragua, 515 F. Supp. 900 (E.D. La. 1981), the Eastern Louisiana Federal District
Court held that the issuance of checks by a central bank on behalf of a commercial
bank constituted a governmental and not a commercial activity and therefore the court
allowed immunity. Id. at 914. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the
commercial activity exception did not apply because the purpose of the act was govern-
mental. 770 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1985). Conversely, a court reached the opposite con-
clusion when an agency of the Mexican government contracted for collating, printing
and binding a two-volume treatise about Mexico, and the court characterized it as com-
mercial activity. Continental Graphics, Div. of Republic Corp. v. Hiller Indus., Inc., 614
F. Supp. 1125 (D.C. Utah 1985). In State Bank of India v. National Labor Relations
Board, 808 F.2d 526 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987), the National
Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") alleged that the State Bank of India had violated U.S.
labor laws by refusing to bargain with a certain U.S. labor union. Id. The court held
that despite the fact that the bank had engaged in this activity for the benefit of a
government shareholder, the acts were commercial activity and thus rendered the bank
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pretation of "commercial activity."1 2 Courts had employed con-
siderable latitude in evaluating what types of activity constituted
commercial activity. 3 The inconsistent application of the com-
mercial activity exception thwarted efforts by plaintiffs to obtain
jurisdiction over non-U.S. parties. 4
This Comment discusses the ramifications that Weltover has
had on the decisions of federal circuit and district courts. Part I
examines the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, its history, and
its "commercial activity exception." Part I then proceeds to de-
scribe Argentina's commercial activity at issue in Weltover, and
the events in Argentina that created the conflict that led to the
Weltover decision. Part II traces Weltover's procedural history, first
describing the decisions .by both the district court and the court
of appeals, and then presenting the decision by the Supreme
Court. In addition, Part ii reviews a sampling of the federal cir-
cuit and district court cases that have followed Weltover's holding.
Part III argues that the Weltover decision is significant because it
provides lower courts with a standard to follow for defining the
"direct effect" requirement of the commercial activity exception.
Part III also notes that, despite the guidance that the Supreme
Court has given through Weltover, the issue of a sovereign's pro-
tection under the FSIA remains unresolved. This Comment con-
cludes that Weltover presents an important decision in the law of
sovereign immunity, however, the question of the scope of the
Weltover holding remains unsettled.
subject to suit. Id. at 537. However, in another case of a bank owned by a government,
the Court for the Southern District of New York denied immunity. Hatzlachh Supply
Inc. v. Savannah Bank of Nigeria, 649 F. Supp. 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). In Hatzlachh, the
Nigerian Government owned 51% of the bank, and the plaintiff alleged that the bank
had released bills of lading for photographic supplies exported by the plaintiff without
the plaintiffs authority. Id. at 689.
12. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (listing examples of cases in which
courts have employed latitude in determining commerciality).
13. See, e.g., Federal Ins. Co. v. Richard I. Rubin & Co., Inc., No. 924177, 1993 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 784, at *17 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 1993) citing H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 16 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6615 (holding that court's
would have a great deal of latitude in determining what is a 'commercial activity excep-
tion' for purposes of FSIA bill). The term "commercial activity exception" of the FSIA
refers to the section of the FSIA which states that non-U.S. sovereigns are not immune
from suit in any case that involves commercial activities carried on in the United States
that have a direct effect in the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2).
14. See supra note 11 (giving examples of court's inconsistency in reaching deci-
sions on commerciality).
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I. THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT OF 1976
The doctrine of sovereign immunity is premised on the
principle that sovereigns, being equal, may not exercise control
over one another.' 5 In the United States, sovereign immunity
has developed greatly over the last century,'6 and is rooted in a
1952 letter, known as the Tate letter, written by the U.S. State
Department legal advisor. 17 The letter discussed the sovereign
immunity exception and conveyed the State Department's view
that sovereigns lose their immunity from suit once they actively
participate in the commercial marketplace.' 8 The commercial
activity exception was subsequently adopted by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Alfred Dunhill of London, 9 which contributed to the
birth of the exception in the FSIA.20 In enacting the FSIA, Con-
gress codified the "restrictive" theory of sovereign immunity es-
poused in the Tate letter.2' In applying the "commercial activ-
ity" exception, however, federal courts, varied in their interpreta-
tion of the exception.2
A. Origins of Sovereign Immunity and the FSIA
Sovereign immunity, ajudicial doctrine founded on the an-
cient principle that "the King can do no wrong," precludes
bringing suit against a government without its consent.25 The
immunity of sovereigns is rooted in the notion that it is inconsis-
15. The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116 (1812). In McFaddon, the
Supreme Court held that "[t]his full and absolute territorial jurisdiction being alike the
attribute of every sovereign, and being incapable of conferring extra-territorial power,
would not seem to contemplate foreign sovereigns nor their sovereign rights as its ob-
jects." Id. at 137; Effects Jurisdiction, supra note 2, at 476.
16. See, e.g., HoUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 8, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6606-07 (dis-
cussing evolution of doctrine of sovereign immunity).
17. HoUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 9, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6607.
18. Id.; Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711
(1976).
19. Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 682.
20. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., - U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 2160, 2165
(1992).
21. HoUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 7, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6605; Effects Jurisdiction,
supra note 2, at 478.
22. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text (discussing lack of uniform stan-
dard for courts).
23. See Owen v. City of Independence, Missouri, 445 U.S. 622, 647 n.28 (1980)
(discussing limitations on immunity); Maryland Port Admin. v. I.T.O. Corp. of Balti-
more, 395 A.2d 145, 149 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978) (discussing origin of sovereign
immunity).
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tent with the dignity and independence of sovereigns if they
were to be subjected to the laws of other jurisdictions. 4 The
earliest manifestations of this doctrine were evident in the pro-
tection from suit afforded to diplomatic agents. 25 In the eight-
eenth and nineteenth centuries, most States were ruled by indi-
vidual sovereigns who, virtually, personified the State.26
In the United States, the immunity of a non-U.S. defendant
from a federal court's assertion of jurisdiction over it, is limited
to claims falling within one of the enumerated exceptions in the
FSIA Prior to the twentieth century, U.S. courts either
granted non-U.S. sovereigns complete immunity or deferred the
issue of whether immunity should be granted to the Executive
Branch.28 Historically, courts in the United States viewed sover-
eign immunity as being absolute.29 As a result, sovereigns were
insulated from suit.3 0 In the twentieth century, courts realized
that the international community had changed.3 1 As sovereigns
24. LEwis, supra note 11, at 1.
25. Id. at 15.
26. Id.
27. 28 U.S.C. § 1605.
28. Drexel Burnham Lambert Group Inc. v. A.W. Galadari, 810 F. Supp. 1375,
1379 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); see Effects Jurisdiction, supra note 2, at 476-77. The Note Effects
Jurisdiction, supra note 2, at 476-77 explains that "[a] Ithough application of the doctrine
need not implicate foreign policy considerations, before adoption of the Act, the execu-
tive branch, through the State Department, played an important role in determining
whether United States courts should hear particular claims against foreign states." Id.
29. See The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 125 (1812). The
Supreme Court in McFaddon noted that "the law of nations ... requires the consent of
the sovereign, either express or implied, before he can be subjected to a foreign juris-
diction." Id.; see, also, Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682,
698 (1976). In Dunhil, the Court stated:
Although it had other views in years gone by, in 1952, as evidenced by
Appendix 2 (the Tate letter) attached to this opinion, the United States aban-
doned the absolute theory of sovereign immunity and embraced the restrictive
view under which immunity in our courts should be granted only with respect
to causes of action arising out of a foreign state's public or governmental ac-
tions and not with respect to those arising out of its commercial or propriety
actions.
Id.; see, e.g., Commercial Exception, supra note 1, at 1 ("Originally, the U.S. recognized
absolute sovereign immunity as an element of international law.").
30. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (explaining problem that plaintiffs
had when attempting to assert jurisdiction over non-U.S. sovereign in U.S. court).
31. Commercial Exception, supra note 1, at 1; Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 703. In Dunhill the
Court noted that "[p ] articipation by foreign sovereigns in the international commercial
market has increased substantially in recent years." Id.; Effects Jurisdiction, supra note 2,
at 501.
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increased their participation in the world market, there was an
increase in the possibility that nations could invoke the sover-
eign immunity defense.32 Sovereigns had the ability to protect
themselves from litigants suing them in a different country than
the one in which they were located.33 Therefore, the potential
for non-U.S. sovereigns to abuse sovereign immunity had in-
creased.34 As a result, courts limited the unrestricted notion of
absolute sovereignty,35 declining to extend sovereign immunity
in cases arising out of purely commercial transactions. 36
B. The Tate Letter
The metamorphosis of foreign sovereign immunity jurispru-
dence, from a traditional absolute application 37 to its current,
32. Commercial Exception, supra note 1, at 1; Effects Jurisdiction supra note 2, at 501.
33. Effects Jurisdiction, supra note 2, at 501.
34. See Commercial Exception, supra note 1, at 1; Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 703. In Dunhill,
the Supreme Court noted that "[t]he potential injury to private businessmen and ulti-
mately to international trade itself from a system in which some of the participants in
the international market are not subject to the rule has therefore increased correspond-
ingly." Id.
35. Id.; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 7, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6605. The re-
port remarked that "[iUn a modern world where foreign state enterprises are every day
participants in commercial activities ... [the House Report] is urgently needed legisla-
tion." Id.; see Drexel Burnham Lambert Group Inc. v. A.W. Galadari, 810 F. Supp. 1375,
1378 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (commenting that for more than one hundred and fifty years
prior to enactment of the FSIA, courts in United States had generally granted complete
immunity to foreign sovereigns); Effects Jurisdiction, supra note 2, at 501. The author of
the Effects Jurisdiction supra note 2, at 501 stated that the "change in policy was imple-
mented in recognition of the marked increase in trade activities between American
nationals and foreign states." Id.
36. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 703 (1976);
Jeffrey N. Martin, Note, Sovereign Immunity - Limits ofJudicial Control - the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976, 18 HARv. INT'L L.J. 429, 435 (1977).
37. Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 698. The Court in Dunhill wrote the following about the
change from the inflexible "absolute" view of sovereign immunity to the current flexi-
ble "restrictive" view of sovereign immunity:
Although it had other views in years gone by, in 1952, as evidenced by Appen-
dix 2 (the Tate letter) attached to this opinion, the United States abandoned
the absolute theory of sovereign immunity and embraced the restrictive view
under which immunity in our courts should be granted only with respect to
causes of action arising out of a foreign state's public or governmental actions
and not with respect to those arising out of its commercial or proprietary ac-
tions. This has been the official policy of our Government since that time as
the attached letter of November 26, 1975, confirms.
Commercial Exception, supra note 1, at 1. Mr. Cutler explains the concept of restrictive
immunity in the following manner:
In 1952 the State Department formally adopted the emerging view of 'restric-
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more flexible approach, has its roots in a 1952 letter written by
Jack Tate, the State Department's legal advisor, to convey the
State Department's views on sovereign immunity to the U.S. At-
torney General.38 In the letter, Tate explained that States are
not immune from suit once they participated in the commercial
marketplace. 9 Thus, the Tate letter indicated that the State De-
partment would adopt the "restrictive" doctrine, which provides
that sovereign immunity in the United States should be granted
only with respect to causes of action arising out of a sovereign's
governmental actions, but not those arising out of its commer-
cial actions.4" The contents of this letter eventually developed
into the commercial exception of the FSIA.41
tive' sovereign immunity in a letter from Jack Tate, the department's legal
advisor. Under this doctrine, foreign states are not immune when they enter
the commercial marketplace, and the Tate Letter states that this principle will
be the basis of the department's future advice on actions against foreign sover-
eigns. The courts then began to adopt this position on a case by case basis.
Id.
38. See Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Department of State, to
Acting Attorney General Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), repiinted in 26 DEP'T ST.
BULL. 984-85 (1952), and in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711
(1976) (app. to opinion of White, J.) [hereinafter Tate Letter]. The Tate Letter to the
Attorney General began with the following introduction:
My Dear Mr. Attorney General:
The Department of State has for some time had under consideration the ques-
tion whether the practice of the Government in granting immunity from suit
to foreign governments made parties defendant in the courts of the United
States without their consent should not be changed. The Department has now
reached the conclusion that such immunity should no longer be granted in
certain types of cases.
The letter concluded with the following summation:
In order that your Department, which is charged with representing the inter-
ests of the Government before the courts, may be adequately informed it will
be the Department's practice to advise you of all requests by foreign govern-
ments for the grant of immunity from suit and of the Department's action
thereon.
Sincerely yours,
For the Secretary of State:
JACK B. TATE
Acting Legal Adviser
Id.
39. Id. at 984; Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 714-15.
40. 26 DEP'T ST. BuLL. at 984; see Effects Jurisdiction, supra note 2, at 477 (discussing
Tate Letter).
41. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2), com-
mercial activity exception).
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C. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba:
Recognition of a Commercial Activity Exception to Foreign
Sovereign Immunity
In Alfred Dunhill of London Inc. v. Republic of Cuba,42 decided
a few months before the passage of the FSIA, the U.S. Supreme
Court explicitly adopted the commercial activity exception of
sovereign immunity.". In Dunhill, the Cuban government confis-
cated the businesses of certain Cuban cigar manufacturers and
named managing agents, known as "interventors," to operate the
seized businesses.44 Alfred Dunhill of London ("Dunhill"), paid
the Cuban government for cigars that Dunhill had purchased
from one of the expropriated Cuban businesses.45 Subse-
quently, the former owners of the expropriated Cuban cigar
companies brought an action against U.S. importers to recover
payments for cigar shipments.46 In Dunhill, the Court consid-
ered whether Cuba's failure to return funds to Dunhill consti-
tuted an "act of state"47 by Cuba, thus precluding jurisdiction
42. 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 685.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 684. The act of state doctrine's established formulation is given in Un-
derhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897):
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other
sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the
acts of the government of another done within its own territory. Redress of
grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open
to be availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves.
Id. at 252.
Almost eighty years later, the essence of the act of state doctrine accompanied by
the Court's opinion of its application was reiterated in Dunhill as the following:
The major underpinning of the act of state doctrine is the policy of foreclos-
ing court adjudications involving the legality of acts of foreign states on their
own soil that might embarrass the Executive Branch of our Government in the
conduct of our foreign relations .... But based on the presently expressed
views of those who conduct our relations with foreign countries, we are in no
sense compelled to recognize as an act of state the purely commercial conduct
of foreign governments in order to avoid embarrassing conflicts with the Exec-
utive Branch. On the contrary ... we fear that embarrassment and conflict
would most likely ensue if we were to require that the repudiation of a foreign
government's debts arising from its operation of a purely commercial business
be recognized as an act of state and immunized from question in our courts.
Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 697 citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427-
28, 431-33 (1964). Currently, the Supreme Court restricts the use of the act of state
doctrine even further. In W.S. Kirkpatrick v. Environmental Tectonics Corp. Intern.,
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over Cuba.4" The Court in Dunhill held that the act of state doc-
trine did not apply because the case involved acts that were com-
mercial rather than public in nature.49 The Court noted that
nothing in the record of the case revealed an act of state with
respect to the defendant's obligation5" to return the sums Dun-
hill mistakenly paid to Cuba.-1
1. Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act: Codification of the
"Restrictive" View of Sovereign Immunity
The FSIA, which was enacted a few months after the
493 U.S. 400 (1990),Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous Court noted that previously
the act of state doctrine had "'the highest considerations of international comity and
expediency'" however, presently it is a "consequence of domestic separation of powers,
reflecting 'the strong sense of the Judicial Branch that its engagement in the task of
passing on the validity of foreign acts of state may hinder' the conduct of foreign af-
fairs." Id, at 404 quoting Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303-04 (1918) &
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964); see AMPAC Group Inc.
v. Republic of Honduras, 797 F. Supp. 973, 978 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (remarking that "the
act of state doctrine either does not apply - or is at its weakest - for acts of state that
consist of purely commercial transactions, and for cases in which no foreign policy goal
of the Executive Branch is impeded").
48. Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 694.
49. Id. (holding facts sufficient to demonstrate that conduct in question was pub-
lic act of those with authority to exercise sovereign powers). This issue resulted in a
four-to-four Court split. The Solicitor General appeared as amicus curiae arguing in
favor of the application of this additional commercial exception. Coincidentally, the
case was argued by Justice Antonin Scalia, then Deputy Solicitor General, who sixteen
years later authored the unanimous opinion in Weltover, expanding the commercial
exception. Id. at 684; see Commercial Exception, supra, note 1, at I (stating that "Dunhill
also included the question of a commercial exception to the 'act of state' doctrine, on
which the court split four-to-four. The Solicitor General appeared as amicus curiae argu-
ing in favor of that additional commercial exception. The case was argued by the Dep-
uty Solicitor General, Antonin Scalia.").
50. Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 695. The Court expressed its agreement with Dunhill's
arguments by stating that it was "persuaded by the arguments of petitioner and by those
of the United States that the concept of an act of state should not be extended to
include the repudiation of a purely commercial obligation owed by a foreign sovereign
or by one of its commercial instrumentalities." Id. at 695.
51. Id. at 691-93. The Court revealed its rejection of Cuba's sovereign immunity
argument with the following exclamation:
Neither does it demonstrate that in addition to authority to operate commer-
cial businesses, to pay their bills and to collect their accounts receivable, [Cu-
ban] interventors had been invested with sovereign authority to repudiate all
or any part of the debts incurred by those businesses. Indeed it is difficult to
believe that they had the power selectively to refuse payment of legitimate
debts arising from the operation of those commercial enterprises.
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Supreme Court's decision in Dunhill,52 requires that courts de-
termine "commercial activity" by referring to the "nature" of the
course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than
reference a transaction's "purpose."53 The FSIA's legislative his-
tory provided additional guidance as to the type of transactions
that the U.S. Congress contemplated would qualify as a commer-
cial activity.5 4 Thus, the statute requires courts to focus on the
type of transaction involved, rather than what entity is a party to
it, or the transaction's ultimate purpose.55
Congress passed the FSIA in 1976 to satisfy several objec-
tives.56 These goals included facilitating the method whereby
52. See Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., - U.S 112 S. Ct. 2160, 2166(1992) (commenting on significance of short period of time between Alfred Dunhill
decision and enactment of FSIA by noting that "[g] iven that the FSIA was enacted less
than six months after our decision in Alfred Dunhill was announced, we think the plural-
ity's contemporaneous description of the then-prevailing restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity is of significant assistance in construing the scope of the Act.") Id.
53. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d). Section 1603(d) defines the term "commercial activity":
A "commercial activity" means either a regular course of commercial con-
duct or a particular commercial transaction or act. The commercial character
of an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of
conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its pur-
pose.
Id.
54. HousE REPORT, supra note 5, at 16, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6615. It gives the
following examples:
Activities such as a foreign government's sale of a service or a product, its
leasing of property, its borrowing of money, its employment or engagement of
laborers, clerical staff or public relations or marketing agents, or its invest-
ment in a security of an American corporation, would be among those in-
cluded within the definition [of commercial activity].
Id. (emphasis added).
55. Walter Fuller Aircraft Sales, Inc. v. Republic of Philippines, 965 F.2d 1375,
1384 (5th Cir. 1992). The Fifth Circuit in Walter Fuller noted that "Congress provided
some guidance in the second sentence of § 1603(d), which directs us to look at the
'nature' of an activity rather than its 'purpose' in determining whether it is commer-
cial." Id.; see AMPAC Group Inc. v. Republic of Honduras, 797 F. Supp. 973, 976 (S.D.
Fla. 1992) ("By statute, the Court must focus on the type of transaction, rather than
what entity is a party to it, or its ultimate objective.").
56. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 7, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6605. The House Re-
port enumerates four of these objectives:
The bill, which has been drafted over many years and which has involved ex-
tensive consultations within the administration, among bar associations and in
the academic community, would accomplish four objectives:
First, the bill would codify the so-called "restrictive" principle of sovereign
immunity, as presently recognized in international law. Under this principle,
the immunity of a foreign state is "restricted" to suits involving a foreign state's
public acts (jure imperii) and does not extend to suits based on its commercial
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plaintiffs could institute suits in U.S. courts against non-U.S. gov-
ernments for acts arising out of commercial activity,17 and pro-
viding a uniform statutory procedure for establishing subject
matter and personal jurisdiction over non-U.S. sovereigns.58
Congress also intended to transform sovereign immunity into a
purely judicial matter,5 9 reduce diplomatic pressure on the Exec-
or private acts (jure gestionis). This principle was adopted by the Department
of State in 1952 and has been followed by the courts and by the executive
branch ever since. Moreover, it is regularly applied against the United States
in suits against the U.S. Government in foreign courts.
Second, the bill would insure that this restrictive principle of immunity is
applied in litigation before U.S. courts. At present, this is not always the case.
Today, when a foreign state wishes to assert immunity, it will often request the
Department of State to make a formal suggestion of immunity to the court.
Although the State Department espouses the restrictive principle of immunity,
the foreign state may attempt to bring diplomatic influences to bear upon the
State Department's determination. A principal purpose of this bill is to trans-
fer the determination of sovereign immunity from the executive branch to the
judicial branch, thereby reducing the foreign policy implications of immunity
determinations and assuring litigants that these often crucial decisions are
made on purely legal grounds and under procedures that insure due process.
The Department of State would be freed from pressures from foreign govern-
ments to recognize their immunity from suit and from any adverse conse-
quences resulting from any unwillingness of the Department to support that
immunity. As was brought out in the hearings on the bill, U.S. immunity prac-
tice would conform to the practice in virtually every other country - where
sovereign immunity decisions are made exclusively by the courts and not by a
foreign affairs agency.
Third, this bill would for the first time in U.S. law, provide a statutory
procedure for making service upon, and obtaining in personam jurisdiction
over, a foreign state. This would render unnecessary the practice of seizing
and attaching the property of a foreign government for the purpose of ob-
taining jurisdiction.
Fourth, the bill would remedy, in part, the present predicament of a
plaintiff who has obtained a judgment against a foreign state. Under existing
law, a foreign state in our courts enjoys absolute immunity from execution,
even in ordinary commercial litigation where commercial assets are available
for the satisfaction of a judgment. H.R. 11315 seeks to restrict this broad im-
munity from execution. It would conform the execution immunity rules more
closely to the jurisdiction immunity rules. It would provide the judgment
creditor some remedy if, after a reasonable period, a foreign state or its enter-
prise failed to satisfy a final judgment.
Id. at 7-8, U.S.C.C.A.N. 6605-06.
57. Velidor v. L/P/G Benghazi, 653 F.2d 812, 816-17 (3d Cir. 1981).
58. Federal Ins. Co. v. Richard I. Rubin & Co., Inc., No. 92-4177, 1993 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 784, at *17 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 1993).
59. Drexel Burnham Lambert Group Inc. v. A.W. Galadari, 810 F. Supp. 1375,
1379 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). Congress passed the FSIA in order to free the Government from
the case-by-case diplomatic pressures of Executive Branch directed determinations, to
clarify the applicable standards, and to ensure due process in matters involving foreign
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utive Branch, and clarify the vague jurisdictional standards.'
Moreover, in enacting the FSIA, Congress created a standard6 1
for the judicial treatment of non-U.S. sovereigns and their agen-
cies.62
Congress adopted a "restrictive view"63 of sovereign immu-
nity via passage of the FSIA.64 The FSIA's declaration of pur-
pose, citing international law, notes that commercial activities of
sovereigns are not immune from the jurisdiction of other sover-
eigns' courts.6" Thus, Congress restricted the immunity of a
sovereigns. Id.; see Commercial Exception, supra note 1, at 1 ("The FSIA was passed in
1976 to regularize procedure by making sovereign immunity a purelyjudicial matter.").
60. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 487-88 (1983). The
Supreme Court in Galadari commented that "as a result, the case-by-case application of
the restrictive theory in matters involving foreign sovereign immunity lacked uniformity
and equity." Galadari, 810 F. Supp. at 1379.
61. See 28 U.S.C. § 1330. This statute provides in relevant part:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to
amount in controversy of any nonjury civil action against a foreign state as
defined in section 1603(a) of this title as to any claim for relief in personam
with respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity either under
sections 1605-1607 of this title or under any applicable international agree-
ment.
(b) Personal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to every claim for
relief over which the district courts have jurisdiction under subsection (a)
where service has been made under section 1608 of this title.
28 U.S.C. § 1330(a),(b).
62. Id.
63. See Tate Letter, supra note 38, 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. at 984, 425 U.S. at 711 (1976)
(app. 2 to opinion of White, J.) which states the following:
A study of the law of sovereign immunity reveals the existence of two conflict-
ing concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established.
According to the newer or restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, the immu-
nity of the sovereign is recognized with regard to sovereign or public acts (jure
imperii) of a state, but not with respect to private acts (jure gestionis).
26 DEP'T ST. BULL. at 984, 425 U.S. at 711; Galadari, 810 F. Supp. at 1379. In 1952, the
State Department adopted the Tate Letter, which called for the application of a 'restric-
tive' theory of foreign sovereign immunity. Id. The restrictive theory of sovereign im-
munity allows immunity for the public acts of a foreign sovereign, and does not immu-
nize the commercial acts or private acts of a foreign sovereign. Id.
64. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 1, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6604-35. The FSIA set
forth specific "standards to be used in resolving questions of sovereign immunity raised
by foreign states before Federal and State courts in the United States." Id. at 12, 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6610; see Greene v. Mt. Adams Furniture, 980 F.2d 590, 594 (9th Cir.
1992). The court in Greene remarked that "Congress reflected the restrictive view of
sovereign immunity when it adopted the Foreign Immunities Act of 1976... [it] specifi-
cally eliminated the sovereign immunity of foreign states involved in commercial activ-
ity within the United States." Id.
65. 28 U.S.C. § 1602. The declaration of purpose provides: "Under international
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State to its public acts (jure imperii), but not to its private acts
(jure gestionis) or commercial activity.66 Therefore, under the
FSIA, some exceptions render non-U.S. governments vulnerable
to suit in U.S. courts.67 The "commercial activity" exception is
the primary example of this. 68
2. Judicial Interpretation of the FSIA's Commercial
Activity Exception
Courts have used various standards to interpret what consti-
tutes "commercial activity" under the FSIA. In Zernicek v. Brown
& Root, Inc. ,69 Michael Zernicek, a U.S. employee of a U.S. sub-
contractor, brought an action against Petroleos Mexicanos
("Pemex"), the Mexican national petroleum company, for per-
sonal injuries that he sustained at the job site in Mexico as a
result of exposure to radiation.70 Zernicek argued that the court
should deny the defendant's assertion of sovereign immunity
based on the commercial activity exception to the FSIA.71 The
defendant, however, alleged that its activities did not have a "di-
rect effect in the United States." 72
In deciding the "direct effect" issue, the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit considered the legislative history of the
FSIA.73 The House Report on the FSIA relied on section 18 of
law, states are not immune from the jurisdiction of foreign courts insofar as their com-
mercial activities are concerned." Id.
66. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 7, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6605.
67. Id.; see supra note 3 (detailing exceptions to jurisdictional immunity).
68. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (a) (2). A foreign state shall not be entitled to immunity from
U.S. courts' jurisdiction if the action
is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the
foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in connection
with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act
outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial
activity of the foreign state elsewhere.., and that act causes a direct effect in
the United States;
Id.
69. 826 F.2d 415 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1043 (1988).
70. Id. Zernicek contended that he became exposed to excessive doses of radia-
tion as a result of Pemex's negligence. Id. at 416.
71. Id. at 417.
72. Id.
73. Id. According to the legislative history, "[t] he House Report on the Act stated
that the direct-effects clause would subject the foreign sovereign to United States juris-
diction consistent with principles set forth in § 18 of the Restatement (Second) of For-
eign Relations Law of the United States." Id.
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the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United
States74 to require that the conduct abroad be "substantial," and
occur as a "direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside
the territory" in order to constitute an effect. 75 Applying this
standard to the case before it, the Fifth Circuit held that the
eventual effect of the personal injury was not "direct" so as to
constitute an exception to sovereign immunity.76 In doing so,
the court followed the lead of many other earlier decisions,
which had adopted the Restatement's standard and applied it to
the FSIA's commercial activity exception.77
For example, in Ohntrup v. Firearms Center Inc.,78 the Eastern
District for the District of Pennsylvania, adopted the Restatement's
standard for "commercial activity." 79 Ohntrup involved gun buy-
ers who brought suit against sellers under theories of warranty,
product liability, and negligence, seeking recovery for injuries
sustained when a gun malfunctioned."0 The defendants im-
pleaded a Turkish gun manufacturer, whose stock was wholly
owned by the Turkish government, and the plaintiffs subse-
quently amended their complaint to include claims against the
Turkish gun manufacturer.8 " The manufacturer attempted to
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES § 18
cmt. f (1965).
75. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 19, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6618. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18 cmt. f (1965).
76. Z7enicek, 826 F.2d at 418-19.
77. See, e.g., Transamerican S.S. Corp. v. Somali Democratic Republic, 767 F.2d
998, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (discussing how defendant's claim that an action lacked fore-
seeability was disingenuous); Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1111 n.9 (5th
Cir. 1985); Berkovitz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 735 F.2d 329, 332 (9th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 469 U.S. 1035 (1984) (using foreseeability to determine "direct effect"); Maritime
Int'l Nominees Establishment v. Republic of Guinea, 693 F.2d 1094, 1110-11 (D.C. Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1982); Ohntrup v. Firearms Ctr. Inc., 516 F. Supp.
1281, 1286 (E.D. Pa. 1981). The court in Ohntrup noted that section 28 U.S.C. § 1605
(a) (2) was to be applied in a manner consistent with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18 cmt. f. Ohntrup, 516 F. Supp. at 1286.
78. 516 F. Supp. 1281 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
79. Id. at 1286. The court held the standard for 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (a) (2), the "com-
mercial activity exception," to be the following:
This section is to be applied in a manner consistent with both the princi-
ples set forth in section 18, Restatement of the Law, Second, Foreign Relations
Law of the United States (1965) ... Thus, the 'direct effect' within this coun-
try must be substantial, and a foreseeable consequence of the actions per-
formed elsewhere.
Id.
80. Id. at 1283.
81. Id.
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deprive the district court of jurisdiction by moving to dismiss all
claims against it on sovereign immunity grounds.8 2 Plaintiffs ar-
gued that their action fell within two of the commercial activity
exceptions in the FSIA.83 The district court agreed that the de-
fendant was not immune from suit because the action was based
upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States. 4
Furthermore, the court agreed with plaintiffs' contention that
the action had a direct effect in the United States, and thus, satis-
fied a second exception of the commercial activity exception."
The court applied the Restatement standard of foreseeability to
the FSIA's commercial activity exception. 6 The court denied
the defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint because
it held that the defendant's actions of supplying pistols for sale
in the United States placed it squarely within the commercial
activity exception.87
II. REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA v. WELTOVER, INC.
In Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.,"8 the U.S. Supreme
Court considered whether Argentina's issuance and reschedul-
ing of bonds were acts taken in connection with a commercial
activity that had a direct effect in the United States. 9 In af-
firming the decision of the district and circuit court, the
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1285. The plaintiffs argued that it was an action "based upon a commer-
cial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state" and it was also "an act
outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the
foreign state elsewhere [which caused] a direct effect in the United States." Id.; see supra
note 3 (citing commercial activity exception in § 1605(a) (2)).
84. 516 F. Supp. at 1286.
85. Id.
86. Id. Section 18 of the Restatement states the following:
Jurisdiction to Prescribe With Respect to Effect Within Territory.
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal conse-
quences to conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an effect within
its territory, if (b) (i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of
activity to which the rule applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is substan-
tial; (iii) it occurs as a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside the
territory; and (iv) the rule is not inconsistent with the principles of justice
generally recognized by states that have reasonably developed legal systems.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18 cmt. f
(1965) (emphasis added); see supra note 79 and accompanying text (discussing the Ohn-
trup court's view on using the Restatement standard).
87. 516 F. Supp. at 1286-87.
88. - U.S. , 112 S. Ct. 2160 (1992).
89. Id. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2163.
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Supreme Court concluded that the issuance of bonds consti-
tuted "commercial activity" because Argentina, in issuing the
bonds, acted in the same manner as a private citizen would act.9"
The Court found Argentina's issuance of bonds to have a "direct
effect" in the United States because Argentina had designated its
accounts in New York as the place of payment.9" The Court's
finding of a "direct effect" permitted plaintiffs to assert jurisdic-
tion over the non-U.S. defendant.9 2
A. Argentina's History Leading up to Weltover
Prior to 1985, the international financial market did not ac-
cept the Argentine peso as a valid medium of exchange.93 As a
result, Argentina used its reserves of U.S. dollars and other com-
monly accepted currencies to pay its international debts.94 Ar-
gentina's use of these funds depleted its currency reserves.95
The exchange crisis96 resulted in Argentine debtors failing to re-
pay their debts.97
In 1982, the Argentine Government, in an attempt to rem-
edy this financial crisis, instituted the Foreign Exchange Insur-
ance Contract program (the "FEIC").98 Prior to the 1980's, Ar-
gentine businessmen found it difficult to obtain U.S. dollars to
engage in international transactions due to the instability of the
Argentine currency.99 The plan to stabilize Argentina's currency
by having the government assume the risk of cross-border trans-
90. Id. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2166-68.
91. Id. at -' 112 S. Ct. at 2168.
92. Id. at -' 112 S. Ct. at 2169.
93. Weltover, Inc. v. Republic of Argentina, 941 F.2d 145,147 (2d Cir. 1991), afj'd,
- U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 2160 (1992).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 753 F. Supp. at 1203, afd, 941 F.2d
145 (2d Cir. 1991), affd, - U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 2160 (1992); Weltover, 941 F.2d at 147.
jArgentina was forced to take extreme measures in order to cope with its economic
woes. Id. Argentina's Ministry of Economy charged Banco Central, as the Central bank
of the republic, with the task of implementing these crisis-management measures. Id.
In 1981, Banco Central began adjusting the prevailing foreign exchange rates, which
caused a severe devaluation of Argentine's local currency. Id. It was due to this devalu-
ation that Argentine debtors were unable to obtain the requisite currency exchange to
satisfy their debts. Id.
97. Weltover, 753 F. Supp. at 1203; Weltover, 941 F.2d at 147.
98. Weltover, 753 F. Supp. at 1203.
99. Weltover, 941 F.2d at 147;Joseph D. Pizzuro, Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.
86 AM. J. INT'L L. 820, 820 (1992).
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actions involving Argentine borrowers included the FEIC pro-
gram. 100 The government provided domestic borrowers with
U.S. dollars to pay their international debts for a predetermined
amount of local currency in an attempt to prevent intervening
currency devaluation. 1 1
By 1982, Argentina lacked sufficient funds to cover the FEIC
contracts. 0 2 As an emergency measure, the Argentine govern-
ment refinanced the debts with, inter alia,1°3 "Registered Bonds
Denominated in United States Dollars," (the "Bonods") .104
When the Bonods matured in May of 1986, Argentina again
lacked sufficient dollar reserves to retire them, and, pursuant to
a presidential decree, unilaterally rescheduled the Bonods repay-
ment.10 5 Some bondholders refused the substitute instruments
as a means of rescheduling the debt 106 and brought an action to
compel defendants to honor their obligations. 10 7
B. Factual Background of Weltover
The controversy in Weltover began when two Panamanian
corporations, Weltover, Inc. ("Weltover") and Springdale Enter-
prises, Inc. ("Springdale"), along with a Swiss banking corpora-
tion, Bank Cantrade, A.G. ("Bank Cantrade"), declined to accept
100. Weltover, 753 F. Supp. at 1203.
101. Id. This concept refers to the problem that Argentine businessmen faced
when Argentine currency lowered in price with relation to other currencies on the
world market. See id. (discussing Argentina's currency devaluation problem).
102. Id.
103. Id. When maturation of the exchange insurance contracts occurred in 1982,
and Banco Central realized it was unable to retire the Argentine debtors' original loans,
it decided to issue two new types of instruments to refinance those debts: Bonods and
promissory notes. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1204. The Bonods provided that on certain scheduled dates in 1986
and 1987, payment would be made in United States dollars. They further provided that
the Bonods would bear interest at the prevailing London Interbank market rate for 180-
day Eurodollar deposits. Id. at 1203. Finally, the money was to be paid into a holder's
account at either New York, London, Frankfurt, or Zurich, at election of the creditor.
Id. at 1204. On or about May 23, 1986 defendants notified plaintiffs that payment
would not be made on the Bonods when due and offered defendants an alternative of a
roll-over of those obligations. Id. Plaintiffs refusal of this alternative was the impetus
for the action in Weltover. See id. The court remarked that "[p]laintiffs refused to par-
ticipate in that roll-over and now assert that Banco Central is in default on its obliga-
tions under the Bonods." Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1203.
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Republic of Argentina's rescheduling of the Bonods.1°8
Weltover, Springdale, and Bank Cantrade (the "plaintiffs") in-
sisted on full repayment in New York, in accordance with the
instruments' original terms. °9 Plaintiffs asserted that Banco
Central, Argentina's Central Bank, was in default of its obliga-
tions under the Bonods and had breached its obligations."'
C. Opinion of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York
In Weltover,11' the defendants l"' contended that the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York lackedjuris-
108. Id. The parties held collectively U.S.$1.3 million of Bonods. Id. The party
that held the greatest number of Bonods was Weltover, who held tide to Bonods total-
ling U.S.$900,000; Springdale's Bonods totalled U.S.$200,000, and Bank Cantrade held
title to U.S.$230,000 worth of Bonods. Id. at 1203 n.1. These creditors were given the
option, as were other Bonod holder creditors, of maintaining their relationship with
the original Argentine debtors, with the Bonods given as a guarantee, or to accept the
Bonods as payment of the original debt. Id. at 1203-04. The drawbacks of this included
the facts that only Banco Central had the ability to pay the creditors in United States
dollars, and furthermore, Banco Central charged a commission of one-tenth percent
(0.1%) for performing these transactions. Id.
109. Id. at 1204. The method by which the Bonods were to assist Argentina in
refinancing its debt was set forth in detail in Banco Central's Communication "A" 251,
dated November 17, 1982. It provided in relevant part:
The instrumentation of the transactions shall be optional for the foreign cred-
itor and may be done in any of the following forms:
(a) Obligations ("Promissory Notes") of the National Government issued in
U.S. dollars to the name of the creditor, for the corresponding amounts.
(b) Registered Bonds of the National Government, issued in U.S. dollars in
increments of U.S.$5,000 and larger denominations.
(c) Since it is not the purpose of these measures to interfere in the loan con-
tract between the debtor and creditor, if they prefer to maintain their relation-
ship directly and instrument it in any form other than the two forms indicated
above, the Central Bank is willing to examine such proposals and conditions,
provided that they respect the terms of maturity indicated in Section 1.1.
Id. at 1204 n.3.
110. Id. These indentures denoted as "Registered Bonds Denominated in United
States Dollars," are referred to in the Weltover cases as "Bonods." Id. at 1203. Banco
Central issued these indentures, acting as financial agent for the Republic of Argentina.
Id.
111. Id. at 1201.
112. Id. at 1203. There were actually two defendants in the Weltover case: Republic
of Argentina and Banco Central. Id. Banco Central's involvement in this suit stemmed
from its issuing of the indentures, known as "Bonods," to the plaintiffs. Id. This Com-
ment, and the Supreme Court, treat the two defendants as a single defendant because
Banco Central acted as the financial agent for the Republic of Argentina pursuant to
Argentina's Foreign Exchange Insurance Contract ("FEIC") program. See id. The court
explains that "[t]hese indentures [the Bonods] were issued by Banco Central, which is
1994] REPUBLJC OF ARGENTINA v. WELTOVER, INC. 745
diction over them under the FSIA, that the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over the defendants violated due process, and, alter-
natively, that the court should dismiss the complaint based on
the doctrine of forum non conveniens.11' The Southern District, in
denying defendant's motion,1 14 explained that Argentina's trans-
actions bore similarity to transactions conducted by private com-
mercial entities." 5 The court reasoned that the plaintiffs' basis
for bringing the action stemmed from the defendant's breach of
its original obligation for a fee, and therefore the suit lacked a
basis in sovereign activity by the Argentine government.1 6 Not-
ing that the plain language of the FSIA required that courts look
to the nature of the act, and not its purpose," 7 the court re-
jected Argentina's argument that sovereign activity existed be-
cause the Argentina's financial crisis caused the issuance of the
Bonods. The court noted that Banco Central" 8 charged credi-
tors a 0.1% commission for the privilege of being paid their
debts in U.S. dollars." 9 The court, however, did not reach the
issue of whether the currency regulations that resulted in the
the financial agent for the Republic of Argentina, pursuant to Argentina's Foreign Ex-
change Insurance Contract ("FEIC") program." Id.
113. Id. at 1204. The doctrine of forum non conveniens refers to the discretionary
power that a court has to decline asserting jurisdiction when the litigation could be
brought in a more appropriate forum. JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CML PROCEDURE
§ 2.2, at 10 (2d ed. 1993).
114. Weltover, 753 F. Supp. at 1209. The district court denied the motion to dis-
miss finding that, notwithstanding defendant's contention, the act of refinancing the
Bonods was a "quintessentially commercial act" and that there existed the necessary
"direct effect" in the United States due to defendant's failure to pay in New York as
promised. Id. at 1205.
115. Id. The Court in Weltover explained that "[ t ] he transactions at issue here fall
squarely within the parameters of what private commercial entities do and have the
capacity to do." Id.
116. Id. at 1205 n.6.
117. Id. at 1205.
118. See supra note 96 (explaining Banco Central's involvement in Weltover case).
119. Weltover, 753 F. Supp. at 1205. Judge John E. Sprizzo presided over the
Weltover case. Id. at 1203. Judge Sprizzo noted that the existence of a profit motive was
a factor, although not dispositive, in his decision to deny defendants' motion to dismiss.
Id. Judge Sprizzo used the following rationale:
In permitting creditors to substitute Banco Central's obligation to pay them in
dollars for that of the original debtors in exchange for a 0.1% commission,
Banco Central was performing a quintessentially commercial act. This is espe-
cially true since the existence of a profit motive, although not dispositive, is a
factor the Court may properly consider in deciding what is a commercial as
opposed to a sovereign act.
Id. at 1205.
746 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 17:726
issuance of the Bonods, and the modification of the original
schedule of payments, constituted "commercial activity" under
the FSIA.120
After concluding that defendant's activity constituted com-
mercial activity, the court considered whether the defendant's
commercial activity had a direct effect in the United States. 12
The court concluded that defendant's default on its debt had a
direct effect within the meaning of the FSIA.122  The court
reached that conclusion by applying the principle espoused by
the Second Circuit in Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Re-
public of Nigeria.121 The district court in Weltover extended the
Texas Trading rule to the case of nonpayment of a debt payable
in the United States to a non-U.S. plaintiff. 1 4 Additionally, the
district court reasoned that public policy supported its finding of
a "direct effect" in the United States.125  It explained that this
result guarded the United States' interest in maintaining New
York's status as an international business center. 126 Businesses
will choose to have payments made to them in New York's finan-
120. Id. at 1205 n.6 ("Insofar as the Currency Regulations... the Government of
Argentina may not have been engaged in commercial activity.")
121. Id. at 1206. The court did not have to address the first two factors which
possess the ability to create the requisite nexus under 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2) because it
was obvious that the case did not involve either "commercial activity carried on in the
United States" by the defendants or "an act performed in the United States in connec-
tion with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere," therefore, the only issue
the court had to resolve was the third factor, namely, "whether defendants' commercial
activity had a direct effect in the United States." Id.; see supra note 3 (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 1605(a) (2)).
122. Weltover, 753 F. Supp. at 1207. This holding expanded the court's previous
holding that nonpayment of a debt payable in the United States to a United States com-
pany constituted a direct effect in the United States for purposes of the FSIA, to hold
that this even applies when, as here, a non-U.S. plaintiff sued. Id. (emphasis ad-
ded) (citing Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d
300, 313 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148, and International Housing Ltd. v.
Rafidian Bank Iraq, 893 F.2d 8, 11 n.3 (2d Cir. 1989)).
123. 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982). In Texas Trad-
ing, the plaintiffs, a group of "trading companies," instituted a breach of contract action
against the Federal Republic of Nigeria and its central bank for their non-compliance
with a cement contract. Id. at 302-06. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held that for purposes of the FSIA, nonpayment of a debt payable in the United States
to a U.S. company constituted a direct effect in the United States, thus warranting juris-
diction. Id. at 312.
124. Weltover, 753 F. Supp. at 1206-07.
125. Id. at 1207. "Public policy considerations also lend support to this conclu-
sion." Id.
126. Id.
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cial centers knowing that, if necessary, they can utilize U.S.
courts to protect their legal rights. 2 7 Therefore, a party's choice
to accept payment in New York implicated the United States' in-
terest in protecting its citizens.128
1. The District Court Addressed the Personal Jurisdiction Issue
District Judge John E. Sprizzo denied the defendant's re-
quest that the court dismiss the plaintiffs' complaints for lack of
personal jurisdiction,12' explaining that under the FSIA, the con-
cepts of personal and subject matter jurisdiction13 0 merge. l13
According to the district court, whenever the FSIA grants a court
subject matter jurisdiction, that court automatically has personal
jurisdiction as well.' 3 2 The Southern District reiterated the rule
that a court's exercise of personal jurisdiction satisfies the due
process requirement if the defendant has sufficient contacts with
the United States such that the exercise ofjurisdiction would not
offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."'3 3
Judge Sprizzo rejected the defendant's argument that the
FSIA permitted personal jurisdiction only where a plaintiff's ac-
tion related to a defendant's contacts with the United States not-
ing that such an interpretation lacked consistency with the lan-
guage and the legislative history of the FSIA.'14 The court em-
127. Id.
128. Id. (noting that "choice to accept payment in New York therefore 'sufficiently
implicates' the United States' interest in protecting people within its territories").
129. Id.
130. Id. "Personal jurisdiction" refers to the ability of a court to bind a particular
party to its judgment. DAVID D. SIEGEL, NEW YoRK PRACrICE 9 (2d ed. 1991). "Subject
matter jurisdiction" refers to the competence of a court to entertain a certain type of
case. Id. at 9-10.
131. Weltover, 753 F. Supp. at 1207.
132. Id. The court previously had established the fact that it had subject matter
jurisdiction because Argentina's activities placed it in the commercial activity exception
of the FSIA. Id. at 1204-08. The court qualified its words, by noting that the rule which
states that under the FSIA, a finding of subject matter jurisdiction necessitates the exist-
ence of personal jurisdiction as well, is subject to the two conditions that there was both
proper service and due process. Id. Therefore, since the issue of proper service was not
in dispute here, the court addressed the issue of due process. Id.
133. Id. at 1207 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316
(1945)). Within the FSIA, the personal jurisdiction requirement of sufficient contacts
looks toward the defendant's contacts with the entire United States, not just the rele-
vant state or forum. See id. at 1207 n.9 (explaining that personal jurisdiction analysis
includes consideration on defendant's contacts with entire United States).
134. Weltover, 753 F. Supp. at 1207 n.10. The court explained that its assessment of
defendants' contacts with the United States was made in order to determine four issues:
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phasized that the plaintiffs had properly alleged the contacts
that the defendants had with the United States in order to exer-
cise personal jurisdiction over them. 135 The court added that
the defendant's maintenance of bank accounts in the United
States indicated that the defendant had availed itself of U.S.
laws.13 6 The court noted that the fact that the defendant had
agreed to pay the Bonods in U.S. dollars pointed to the foresee-
ability of an action in the United States for breach of that obliga-
tion.1 3 7
2. The District Court Addressed the Forum Non
Conveniens Issue
The District Court for the Southern District of New York
also addressed the defendant's motion to dismiss the action pur-
suant to the doctrine of forum non conveniens 13 8 This doctrine
(1) the extent to which defendants availed themselves of American law; (2)
the extent to which litigation in the United States was foreseeable to them; (3)
the inconvenience to defendants of litigating in the United States; and (4) the
countervailing interest of the United States in hearing the suit.
Id. at 1207 citing Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 312. The court noted that a defendant can
be subject to personal jurisdiction, consistent with due process, even in the absence of
the plaintiffs action arising out of or being related to the defendant's contacts with the
forum state. Id. However, such an absence would necessitate more substantial contacts
with the forum to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Id. at 1208. The court
explained that defendants' interpretation of the FSIA rendered the "direct effect" pro-
vision of 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (a) (2) superfluous because that section specifically deals with
the exercise ofjurisdiction in situations where all the relevant contacts exist outside the
United States. Id. at 1207 n.10. Furthermore, in previous FSIA cases, courts had even
considered contacts that were unrelated to the plaintiff's cause of action. Id.
135. Id. at 1208. The court provided several of plaintiffs' allegations which justi-
fied the exercise of personal jurisdiction over them. Id. Quoting from the Complaint
and Affidavit of Richard Cutler, the attorney for Weltover, Inc., the court delineated the
following allegations of contact with the United States: (1) that Banco Central had
promised to pay plaintiffs in New York, a location in the United States; (2) the Argen-
tine government maintained consulates throughout the United States; (3) Banco Cen-
tral had commercial activities in the United States; and (4) that both the Republic of
Argentina and Banco Central maintained bank accounts in the United States. Id. The
court also explained that due to the lack ofjurisdictional discovery, plaintiffs were only
required to allege in good faith legally sufficient allegations ofjurisdiction. Id. at n. 11.
136. Id. This was true because the banking and insurance industries which pro-
tected the accounts were governed by U.S. laws. Id.
137. Id. at 1208.
138. Id. The doctrine of forum non conveniens gives authority to a district court to
dismiss an action in the event that there exists other public or private interests which
outweigh the ordinary consideration given to the plaintiff's desired forum. Id. The
determination of private interests includes weighing such factors as the ease of access to
proof and the availability of witnesses. Id. Public interests determination include the
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refers -to the discretionary power that a court has to decline exer-
cising jurisdiction when courts believe that the convenience of
the parties and the ends of justice would be better served if the
action were to be brought in another forum.1 3 9  The district
court in Weltover agreed that the forum non conveniens doctrine
applied to actions governed by the FSIA. 4 ° The court ex-
plained, however, that it must determine whether an alternative
forum to resolve the dispute exists. 141 The court reasoned that
the defendant failed to show how Argentina qualified as an ade-
quate alternative forum. 142 The court noted that the defendant
failed to provide a list of witnesses it would call at trial, which is a
prerequisite for a court dismissing an action pursuant to forum
non conveniens.143 Consequently, the district court rejected the
defendant's motion. 4
4
D. The Opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
The defendant appealed the district court order denying its
motion to dismiss to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit.14  The Second Circuit held 46 that the district court
properly asserted jurisdiction under the FSIA.1 47 Mentioning its
evaluation of the administrative burden on the court, the burden thatjury duty imposes
upon the community when the action bears no relationship with the community and
the considerations raised by the potential need of an application of foreign law. Id.
139. E.g., Johnson v. Spider Staging Corp., 555 P.2d 997, 999-1000 (Wash. 1976)
(en banc); Leet v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 155 P.2d 42, 44 (Cal. 1944).
140. Weltover, 753 F. Supp. at 1208 citingVerlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria,
461 U.S. 480, 490 n.15 (1983).
141. Id. at 1209.
142. Id. The court stated that defendants had not submitted affidavits to indicate
where they wanted the forum to be, however, the court considered it "obvious" that
defendants wanted Argentina as their forum. Id. The court explained that there
lacked information in the record which would have allowed the court to assess whether
plaintiffs could even sue the Republic of Argentina in an Argentine court, whether
plaintiffs would have been able to enforce ajudgment and receive U.S. dollars in satis-
faction of such ajudgment, whether the action would be barred by the statute of limita-
tions, or whether plaintiffs would have had the ability to compel the testimony of wit-
nesses. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. The court bolstered this decision by noting that public interest factors
would oppose the dismissal under forum non conveniens, the need to apply Argentine law
does not justify dismissal under forum non conveniens and finally, as this was a non-jury
trial case, a local jury would not have had the onus of resolving the dispute. Id.
145. 941 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1991).
146. Id.
147. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611. These sections of FSIA subject States to suit in U.S.
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previous difficulty in interpreting Congress' definition of "com-
mercial activity" in the FSIA,' 48 the Second Circuit rejected treat-
ing transactions as being sovereign in character merely because
they were a part of a "broader governmental scheme." a49 Ac-
cording to the Second Circuit, to find immunity in such situa-
tions would violate the FSIA's intent of codifying the restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity.150
The court also rejected the defendant's characterization of
the issuance and unilateral rescheduling of Bonods as a govern-
mental effort to conserve scarce resources."' The Second Cir-
cuit noted that despite the defendant's attempts at casting Ar-
gentina's actions as a response to its failing economy, the case
centered on Argentina's issuance of the Bonods, and its subse-
quent failure to repay that debt upon maturity. 5 The Second
Circuit reasoned that issuing bonds exemplified activity that pri-
vate people engaged in.'" Focusing on the "nature" of the
transaction in issue, not the general "purpose," the court further
reasoned that the acts of issuing the Bonods placed Argentina in
the "stream of international commerce in foreign currency.'
' 54
The Second Circuit further analyzed whether the relevant
acts caused a "direct effect" in the United States. 55 In determin-
ing whether the effect was both sufficiently "direct" and "in the
United States," the Second Circuit queried whether Congress
would have wanted a U.S. court to hear the case.1 56 The court
established that an effect is direct if it follows as an immediate
courts for, inter alia, acts taken "in connection with a commercial activity" that have "a
direct effect in the United States." Id.. § 1605(a) (2).
148. Weltover, 941 F.2d at 150. The court had confronted this problem earlier in
Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 308-09 (2d
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982), where it construed the FSIA to mean that
"if the activity is one in which a private person could engage, [the foreign sovereign] is
not entitled to immunity." Id. at 309.
149. Weltover, 941 F.2d at 150.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 151.
152. Id. at 150-51.
153. Id. at 151.
154. Id.
155. Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (stating that one way act can be "commercial"
is if it is act that is committed outside territory of United States in connection with non-
U.S. sovereign elsewhere and it causes direct effects in United States).
156. Weltover, 941 F.2d at 152 citing Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Re-
public of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 313 (2d. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982).
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consequence of a sovereign's activity.15 7 The court found that
the effects of the acts were "direct."'58 It noted that the defend-
ant's acts caused a direct effect on the plaintiffs because the de-
fendant's breach of the Bonod agreement deprived the plaintiffs
of their contractual rights.1 59 The court found the issue of the
effect existing "in the United States" more complicated to re-
solve.'6 0 In determining whether the effect was "in the United
States," the court focused upon whether legally significant acts
giving rise to the claim occurred in the United States. 6' The
court found that legally significant acts occurred in the United
States because the contract gave the plaintiffs the option to re-
quest payment in New York, and the defendant neglected to
make payment in New York.' 62
Finally, the Second Circuit cited public policy reasons to
support its holding.163 It argued that the Congressional objec-
tive in enacting the "direct effects" clause was intended to permit
U.S. courts to hear actions that promote the interests of forum
jurisdictions in controlling the conduct that occurs within their
borders.' 64 Thus, the court held that the defendant's issuance of
the Bonods, followed by the subsequent breach of its agree-
ments, constituted "commercial activity" within the meaning of
the FSIA, and that the defendant's acts had caused a direct effect
in the United States, so that the defendant was not entitled to
sovereign immunity.'65
157. Weltover, 941 F.2d at 152. The Second Circuit explained that in order for the
financial loss to be considered 'direct,' "the corporate entity must itself be placed in
financial peril as an immediate consequence of the defendant's unlawful activity." Id.
158. Id. (noting that it "need not tarry long over whether the effect, in this case,
was direct").
159. Id.
160. Id. (noting that "[a] more troublesome inquiry is whether the effect was suffi-
ciently 'in the United States' to warrant our exercise of subject matter jurisdiction").
161. Id.
162. Id. at 153; see supra notes 121-28 and accompanying text (discussing trial
court's determination of "direct effect").
163. Weltover, 941 F.2d at 153.
164. Id. The court explained that New York was a preeminent commercial center
which had an interest in protecting those who do business there. Id This interest
stemmed from the knowledge that if corporate entities cannot rely upon New York's
ability to protect their rights in business transactions in New York they would look for
other locations to take their business to. Id.
165. Id.
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E. Decision of the U.S. Supreme Court
The U.S. Supreme Court granted Argentina's petition for
certiorari on the following two issues. 16 6 First, the Court consid-
ered whether the transaction between plaintiffs and defendant
could be classified as a "commercial activity" within the meaning
given in the FSIA. 167 Second, the Court analyzed whether there
was a sufficient nexus between Argentina's act of issuing Bonods
and the United States, in order to determine whether the plain-
tiffs' claim of nonpayment in New York satisfied the "direct ef-
fect" needed for the statutorily required 161 jurisdictional pur-
pose. 1 6 9
1. "Commercial Activity" Analysis
Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for a unanimous Court, af-
firmed the judgment of the Second Circuit.1 70  The Court first
analyzed the FSIA's definition of "commercial activity. "171 The
Court noted that the "commercial activity" exception was the
most significant of the FSIA's exceptions. 172 The Court observed
that FSIA inadequately, and to some extent ambiguously, de-
fined "commercial activity."'7 ' For this reason, the Court found
it necessary to analyze the history of the enactment of the FSIA
in order to resolve the ambiguous definition of "commercial ac-
tivity.
' 
"74
166. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., - U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 2160 (1992).
There was a third issue raised by one of the arguments made by Argentina that went
unresolved. Id. at 2169. Defendant argued that a finding ofjurisdiction would violate
the constitutional standard of due process. Id. The Court did ponder the issue of its
ability to classify a non-U.S. state as a "person" for purposes of the due process clause.
Id. The Court was able to avoid resolving this question by finding that Argentina's
conduct did not violate constitutional standards. Id.; see Georges R. Delaume, United
States: Supreme Court Opinion in Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 31 I.L.M. 1220, 1221
(1992) (discussing Supreme Court's opinion in Weltover).
167. Weltover, - U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2162.
168. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2)(iii).
169. Delaume, supra note 166, at 1220.
170. Weltover, - U.S. at -., 112 S. Ct. at 2169.
171. Id. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2165. The FSIA defines "commercial activity" as "either
a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act.
The commercial character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature
of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its
purpose." 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d).
172. Weltover, - U.S. -., 112 S. Ct. at 2164.
173. Id. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2165.
174. Id. The FSIA's definition merely stated that the commercial nature of an
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The Court noted that in enacting the FSIA, Congress at-
tempted to codify the emerging "restrictive" theory of foreign
sovereign immunity endorsed by the State Department as early
as 1952.175 The Court stated that the first instance in which it
addressed the issue of the validity of the restrictive theory oc-
curred in the case of Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of
Cuba.'76 In Alfred Dunhill, a plurality of the Court noted that af-
ter the 1952 endorsement of the restrictive theory, federal courts
consistently held that U.S. courts had the authority to assert ju-
risdiction over non-U.S. sovereigns in cases "arising out of purely
commercial transactions."' 7 7 Additionally, considering that Con-
gress enacted the FSIA less than six months following the plural-
ity decision in Alfred Dunhill, the Court in Weltover reasoned that
the restrictive theory formed the basis for determining the scope
of the FSIA.17a Thus, the Supreme Court in Weltover concluded
that when a government acts in the manner of a private citizen,
the government's actions constitute "commercial activity" within
the meaning of the FSIA. 79
The Court next clarified the FSIA's provision that the "na-
ture," rather than the "purpose," of an act determines the com-
mercial character of an act.'8 0 The Court explained that an act
is commercial if the act is one that a private party engages in
activity does not depend upon whether the activity consists of a single act or a regular
course of conduct. In addition, the Court acknowledged that the FSIA states that the
"nature" of the act, rather than the "purpose," determined "commercial" under the
FSIA. Id
175. Id. The Supreme Court noted that "the FSIA was not written on a clean slate
the Act (and the commercial exception in particular) largely codifies the so-called
'restrictive' theory of foreign sovereign immunity." Id.; see supra notes 37-41 and accom-
panying text (discussing Tate Letter).
176. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 703 (1976);
see supra notes 42-51 and accompanying text (discussing Alfred Dunhill).
177. Alfred Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 703; see supra notes 42-51 and accompanying text
(discussing Alfred Dunhill).
178. Weltover, - U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2166. The Court noted that given "that
the FSIA was enacted less than six months after our decision in Alfred Dunhill was an-
nounced, we think the plurality's contemporaneous description of the then-prevailing
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity is of significant assistance in construing the
scope of the Act." Id.
179. Id. The Court concluded "that when a foreign government acts, not as regu-
lator of a market, but in the manner of a private player within it, the foreign sovereign's
actions are 'commercial' within the meaning of the FSIA." Id.
180. See supra note 171 (setting forth text of 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d), FSIA's definition
of commercial activity).
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during "trade and traffic or commerce."' 8 ' The Court distin-
guished sovereign activity from commercial activity by explaining
that sovereign activity is activity that a private party cannot exer-
cise.' 82 Commercial activity, conversely, includes entering into
contracts because private companies can use sales contracts to
acquire goods.' 8 3 The Court cited examples of how applying the
test of "nature" versus "purpose" yielded different results.18 4 The
Court noted that if a foreign government were to issue regula-
tions limiting foreign currency exchange it would constitute a
sovereign activity because such authoritative control of com-
merce cannot be exercised by a private party.' s5 On the other
hand, if a sovereign were to contract to buy army boots or even
bullets, it would be a "commercial" activity, because private com-
panies can similarly contract to acquire goods.' 86
In deciding Weltover, the Court noted that the Bonods con-
tained many commercial characteristics. 8 7 For example, private
parties could hold them and they could be negotiated with and
traded on the international market. 88 The Court rejected the
defendant's contention that the Bonods differed from ordinary
bonds because they did not have the ordinary commercial conse-
quence of raising capital or financing acquisitions.' 9 Argentina
used the Bonods to restructure its preexisting obligations as pri-
vate parties use bonds to refinance debt.' 90 The Court con-
cluded that in spite of the difficulties in distinguishing "purpose"
from "nature," courts must make this distinction due to the ex-
plicitness of the FSIA.19' Thus, the Court found no basis for dis-
tinguishing Argentina's assumption of debt from other commer-
181. Weltover, . U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2166 quoting BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 270
(6th ed. 1990).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. The Court explained that "a foreign government's issuance of regulations
limiting foreign currency exchange is a sovereign activity, because such authoritative
control cannot be exercised by a private party, whereas a contract to buy army boots or
even bullets is a 'commercial' activity, because private companies can similarly use sales
contracts to acquire goods." Id.
187. Id. at , 112 S. Ct. at 2166.
188. Id.
189. Id. at __, 112 S. Ct. at 2167.
190. Id.
191. Id. The Court explained that "[h]owever difficult it may be in some cases to
separate 'purpose' ... from 'nature' ... the statute unmistakably commands that to be
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cial activities taken by a sovereign. 192
The Court rejected Argentina's contention that a court
must fully consider the context of a transaction to determine
whether the conduct should be deemed "commercial. " ' The
Court reasoned that since the FSIA established that the "nature"
of an activity governs, no reason existed to treat the issuance of
debt different from other activities of sovereigns.' The Court
noted that even if it were to view the transaction in such a man-
ner, there was nothing unique about the issuance of the Bonods
that set it apart from private commercial transactions. 195
Argentina also argued that the Second Circuit erred in its
adoption of a per se rule19 6 that deemed all issuance of debt
instruments as commercial activity. The Supreme Court, how-
ever, declined to reach the merits of the propriety of such a per-
se determination because it argued that even if it were to view
the issuance of the Bonods in the full context, the issuance
would be analogous to a private commercial transaction. 197 The
Court proceeded to analyze other arguments offered by Argen-
tina to distinguish the Bonods from other commercial activity in
order to avoid having jurisdiction asserted over them.198 As a
result of the Court's conclusion that Argentina's reason for issu-
ing the Bonods was irrelevant, the Court found that Argentina's
done." Id. citing De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385, 1393 (5th
Cir. 1985).
192. Id. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2167-68.
193. Id. at __,112 S. Ct. at 2166-67.
194. Id. The Court reasoned that "[because the FSIA has now clearly established
that the 'nature' governs, we perceive no basis for concluding that the issuance of debt
should be treated as categorically different from other activities of foreign states." Id. at
2167.
195. Id. The Court, in considering defendant's argument, noted that "even in full
context, there is nothing about the issuance of these Bonods (except perhaps its pur-
pose) that is not analogous to a private commercial transaction." Id.
196. See Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 941 F.2d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 1991),
aft'd, - U.S. -., 112 S. Ct. 2160 (1992) quoting Shapiro v. Republic of Bolivia, 930 F.2d
1013, 1018 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that it "is self-evident that issuing public debt is a
commercial activity within the meaning of [the FSIA]").
197. Weltover, - U.S. at __, 112 S. Ct. at 2167.
198. Id. Defendants' arguments included an attempt to distinguish the Bonods
from commercial bonds by the fact that they did not have the ordinary commercial
consequence of raising capital of financing acquisitions. Id. The Court's response was
that private parties issue bonds, not just to raise capital or to finance purchases, but also
to refinance debt. This was the same reason that Argentina had for issuing the Bonods.
Id.
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act had constituted "commercial activity" under the FSIA.19 9
2. The Direct Effect Test
After holding that Argentina's issuance of Bonods consti-
tuted "commercial activity" within the meaning of the FSIA, the
Court concluded that Argentina's unilateral rescheduling of the
Bonods had a "direct effect" 20 0 in the United States under the
FSIA.2 1' The Supreme Court agreed 20 2 with the Second Circuit
that for an effect to be "direct" it must be an "immediate conse-
quence" of the defendant's activity.203 The Court noted that the
legislative history of the FSIA did not require an effect to be both
"substantial" and "foreseeable" for the effect to constitute a "di-
rect effect." 20 4  The Court found that Argentina's unilateral
rescheduling of the maturity dates had a "direct effect" on re-
spondents and occurred "in the United States."20 5 The Court
reasoned that because the defendant had designated its ac-
counts in New York as the place of payment and had made some
interest payments into those accounts, there existed a "direct ef-
fect" in the United States °.2 6 The Court did not agree with the
Second Circuit's reason that the rescheduling had a "direct ef-
fect" merely because Congress would not have wanted New
York's status as a world financial leader to be jeopardized. °7
The Supreme Court emphasized that the FSIA permits a non-
199. Id. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2167-68.
200. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (2); see supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing FSIA's requirement of "direct effect").
201. Weltover, - U.S. at , 112 S. Ct. at 2168.
202. Id.
203. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 941 F.2d 145, 152 (2d Cir. 1991),
affd, - U.S. -. , 112 S. Ct. 2160 (1992).
204. Weltover, - U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2168.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. See supra note 157 (giving Second Circuit's logic for its conclusion as to "di-
rect effect"); Weltover, - U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2168. The Supreme Court explained
their rejection of the Court of Appeal's logic as follows:
The Court of Appeals concluded that the rescheduling of the maturity
dates obviously had a "direct effect" on respondents. It further concluded that
that [sic] effect was sufficiently "in the United States" for purposes of the FSIA,
in part because "Congress would have wanted an American court to entertain
this action" in order to preserve New York City's status as "a preeminent com-
mercial center."... The question, however, is not what Congress "would have
wanted" but what Congress enacted in the FSIA. Although we are happy to
endorse the Second Circuit's recognition of "New York's status as a world fi-
nancial leader," the effect of Argentina's rescheduling in diminishing that sta-
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U.S. plaintiff to sue a non-U.S. sovereign in a U.S. court.2" 8
Alternatively, Argentina argued that finding jurisdiction vio-
lated the Due Process Clause2 °9 of the Fifth Amendment. 210  To
avoid violating the Fifth Amendment, Argentina insisted that the
"direct effect" must satisfy the "minimum contacts" test of Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Washington.21 ' Adhering to the "minimum
contacts" test set forth in International Shoe, the Supreme Court
in Weltover, assuming arguendo that a government is a "person"
for purposes of the Due Process Clause, found that Argentina
possessed the "minimum contacts" needed to satisfy the constitu-
tional test.212 By issuing negotiable debt instruments denomi-
nated in U.S. dollars and payable in New York, all in conjunction
with the defendant's appointment of a financial agent in New
York, the Court concluded that Argentina purposely availed it-
self of the privilege of conducting activities within the United
States.213
F. Implications of Weltover on Subsequent Interpretations of the
Commercial Activity Exception
As a result of the Weltover decision, subsequent courts have
tus (assuming it is not too speculative to be considered an effect at all) is too
remote and attenuated to satisfy the "direct effect" requirement of the FSIA.
Id.
208. Weltover, - U.S. at , 112 S. Ct. at 2169 citingVerlinden B.V. v. Central Bank
of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 489 (1983).
209. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The concept of "due process" includes the notion
that a person is guaranteed fair procedures which protect a person's property from
unfair governmental interference or taking. This concept as it is embodied in the Fifth
Amendment requires that a law not be unreasonable, and that the methods of suit used
should have a reasonable and substantial relation to the object being sought. Id.
210. Weltover, - U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2169.
211. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). In International Shoe, the U.S. Supreme Court sug-
gested the following pragmatic analysis to determine the existence of "minimum con-
tacts":
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to ajudgment
in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have
certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
Id. (citations omitted). It was conceded by Argentina that the issue of whether a consti-
tutional basis for personal jurisdiction existed was not before the Court as an independ-
ent question, but was merely to assist in interpreting the "direct effect" requirement of
the FSIA. Weltover, - U.S. at _, 112 S. Ct. at 2169 n.2.
212. Weltover, - U.S. at.., 112 S. Ct. at 2169.
213. Id., quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985).
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dealt with the commercial activity issue with greater precision.214
The courts have adopted Weltover's standards in determining
what constitutes "commercial activity" and "direct effect."215 By
utilizing Weltover, the courts have asserted jurisdiction over non-
U.S. defendants in a greater number of cases than they did prior
to Weltover.216 In addition, subsequent courts have been able to
justify declining jurisdiction by referring to the Weltover rules.217
1. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson: The U.S. Supreme Court's Approach
to the FSIA's Commercial Exception in the Shadow
of Weltover
The U.S. Supreme Court revisited the issue of defining the
FSIA's commercial activity exception in Saudi Arabia v. Nelson.218
In Nelson, a married couple (Mr. and Mrs. Nelson), filed a tort
action against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the King Faisal Spe-
cialist Hospital, and Royspec, the hospital's purchasing agent in
the United States." 9 The complaint alleged that the hospital
hired Mr. Nelson after he had read its recruitment advertise-
ment in a U.S. publication.220 Mr. Nelson started working in the
hospital in December of 1983, monitoring facilities, equipment,
utilities, and maintenance systems to ensure the safety of pa-
tients and staff.221 Four months later, he allegedly found defects
in the hospital's oxygen and nitrous oxide lines that he believed
posed a safety hazard.222 Mr. Nelson subsequently reported the
defects to hospital officials and a Saudi commission. 223 He al-
leged that the hospital officials advised him to ignore the de-
fects, and that certain hospital employees summoned him to the
hospital's security office where agents of the Saudi government
214. See supra note 7 (listing some opinions which cited Weltover to assist in resolv-
ing a commercial activity case).
215. Id.
216. See id. (listing cases which have used Weltover as support for finding jurisdic-
tion).
217. Id. (giving examples of courts which have used Supreme Court's decision in
Weltover to decline jurisdiction).
218. - U.S. -, 113 S. Ct. 1471 (1993).
219. Id. at -., 113 S. Ct. at 1474; Commercial Exception, supra note 1, at 1; Jurisdic-
tion, N.J. L.J., Mar. 29, 1993, at 58; Supreme Court Bars Tort Claim in Saudi Recruitment
Case, 8 Lis.ILnY WEEK, Mar. 29, 1993, § 13, Vol. 8, Mar. 29, 1993, at § 13.
220. Nelson, - U.S. at -, 113 S. Ct. at 1474-75.
221. Id. at -, 113 S. Ct. at 1475.
222. Id.
223. Id.
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wrongfully arrested, beat, and tortured him after transporting
him to a jail cell. 22 4
In Nelson, the U.S. Supreme Court analyzed the commercial-
ity of defendant's acts.2 25 Justice David Souter, delivering the
opinion of the Court2 2 6 held that the district court lacked juris-
diction because the Nelsons' action was not "based upon a com-
mercial activity" within the meaning of the FSIA's commercial
activity exception.2 27 Justice Souter explained that even if the
Court were to accept the Nelsons' allegations about Mr. Nelson's
recruitment and employment as true, the petitioners' tortious
conduct failed to qualify as "commercial activity" within the
meaning of the FSIA.22 a Citing Weltover, the Court emphasized
that the FSIA codified the "restrictive" theory of foreign sover-
eign immunity. 229 It explained that the Nelsons cannot use the
"purpose" of defendants' actions to characterize the alleged
abuse of police power in order to have it qualify as a "commer-
cial activity." 2 0
Justice Byron White and Justice Harry Blackmun concurred
in the judgment, noting that the commercial conduct upon
which the Nelsons based their complaint had not been carried
on in the United States.2 ' Justices White and Blackmun, how-
ever, disagreed with the majority that the Nelsons' action was not
"based upon a commercial activity." 2 2 Justice White explained
224. Id.
225. Id. at -., 113 S. Ct. at 1476-77. The issue of whether defendant's acts had a
direct effect in the United States was not before the Court because the first clause re-
quires the action to be one "based upon a commercial activity," and "carried on in the
United States." Id.; see supra note 3 (citing commercial activity exception); see also Com-
mercial Exception, supra note 1, at 1; Jurisdiction, N.J. L.J., Mar. 29, 1993, at 58; Supreme
Court Bars Tort Claim in Saudi Recruitment Case, 8 LIAminrv WEEK, Mar. 29, 1993, § 13.
226. Nelson, - U.S. at -_, 113 S. Ct. at 1473. ChiefJustice William Rehnquist and
Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas joined the major-
ity. Id.
227. Id. at , 113 S. Ct. at 1481.
228. Id. at , 113 S. Ct. at 1480. The Court noted that "[w]hatever may have been
the Saudi Government's motivation for its allegedly abusive treatment of Nelson, it re-
mains the case that the Nelsons' action is based upon a sovereign activity immune from
the subject-matter jurisdiction of United States courts under the Act." Id.
229. Id. at -' 113 S. Ct. at 1478.
230. Id. at -' 113 S. Ct. at 1479. The Court concluded that "where a claim rests
entirely upon activities sovereign in character, as here . . .jurisdiction will not exist
under that clause regardless of any connection the sovereign acts may have with com-
mercial activity." Id. at -, 113 S. Ct. at 1478 n.4.
231. Id. at - at 113 S. Ct. at 148.
232. Id.
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that the relevant inquiry should not focus on the manner in
which private parties ought to engage in commerce, but whether it
was the method in which private parties occasionally do engage in
commerce. 3  He indicated that the operation of a hospital is a
commercial enterprise, and taking retaliatory action against
whistleblowing is within the scope of commercial activity.234 As
support for this contention, Justice White cited the House and
Senate Reports that accompanied the FSIA's legislation.23 5
These reports explain that a foreign government's employment
or engagement of laborers, clerical staff or marketing agents
would be among those included within the definition of "com-
mercial activity."2 36 Justice White applied the Weltover rule to
emphasize that when a government acts, not as a regulator of a
market, but as a private player within it, the government's ac-
tions are "commercial" within the meaning of the FSIA. 3 7
Justice John Paul Stevens, in his dissent, agreed with Justice
White that the operation of the hospital and its employment
practices and disciplinary procedures were "commercial activi-
ties" within the meaning of the FSIA.238 He disagreed, however,
with Justice White's contention that the hospital lacked suffi-
cient contact with the United States tojustify the exercise of fed-
eral jurisdiction. 39 Justice Stevens stated that he would affirm
the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which
declared that the operation of the hospital constituted a com-
mercial activity with "sufficient contact with the United States to
justify the exercise of federal jurisdiction." 240
2. The Ninth Circuit's Attempt to Determine the Scope of the
Supreme Court's Decision in Weltover
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit lacked una-
nimity when it addressed the issue of determining the scope of
233. Id. at - ,113 S. Ct. at 1481. Justice White argued that "the question we must
ask is whether it is the manner in which private parties at times do engage in com-
merce." Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at -, 113 S. Ct. at 1481-82.
236. Id., quoting HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 16.
237. Id. at -, 113 S. Ct. at 1484, citing Weltover, - U.S. at -. , 112 S. Ct. at 2162.
238. Id. at -. , 113 S. Ct. at 1487-88 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
239. Id. at -, 113 S. Ct. at 1488-89.
240. Id. at -, 113 S. Ct. at 1488.
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Weltover in Chuidian v. Philippine National Bank.24' The Ninth
Circuit was split on the question of whether the Supreme Court
in Weltover decided more than the fact that Argentina's issuance
of bonds was a commercial activity having a direct effect in the
United States. 242 In Chuidian, the plaintiff relied upon Weltover
to support his contention that the district court erred in dis-
missing his complaint for lack of jurisdiction. *3 Vincente B.
Chuidian held interests in various businesses within Califor-
nia. In 1985, the Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guar-
antee Corporation (the "Exporter"), an instrumentality of the
Republic of the Philippine's government, sued several of
Chuidian's businesses in Santa Clara Superior Court.2 4 5 Follow-
ing a counterclaim by Chuidian, the parties settled the Santa
Clara County litigation.2 46  The settlement consisted of, inter
alia, Philippine's issuance of an irrevocable letter of credit to
Chuidian payable at the counters of the Exporter's Los Angeles
Branch.247
Approximately one year later, the Philippine Presidential
Commission on Good Government (the "Commission"),248 an
executive agency established to recover "ill-gotten wealth" accu-
mulated by President Ferdinand Marcos and his confederates, 49
instructed the Exporter to refrain from making payment on the
letter of credit that had been issued to Chuidian.2 50 The Ex-
241. 976 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1992).
242. Id. The majority held that the "Weltover Court decided only that Argentina's
issuance of bonds was a commercial activity with a direct effect in the United States for
purposes of asserting jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act." Id. at
564.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 562.
245. Id. The underlying facts explaining why Philippine sued Chuidian are set
forth in Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1990).
246. Chuidian, 976 F.2d at 562.
247. Id.
248. Id. The February 26, 1986, overthrow of President Marcos led to his replace-
ment with President Corazon Aquino and her new government. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. The Commission suspected that the Santa Clara County litigation settle-
ment was a fraudulent agreement between Marcos and Chuidian. Id. The motive that
was suspected for the fraudulent agreement was that it was to pay off Chuidian for his
cooperation in suppressing information regarding Marcos' involvement in Chuidian's
commercial enterprises. Id. This suspicion prompted the Commission to prevent Phil-
ippine's payment under the letter of credit to secure payment in the event that its
examination of the settlement revealed impropriety. Id.
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porter followed the Commission's order. 5'
Chuidian brought suit against the Exporter in Los Angeles
County Superior Court.25 2 The defendant removed the action to
the California federal district court, which determined that the
terms of the letter of credit could not be enforced. 253  The dis-
trict court agreed with the merits of the Exporter's defense of
illegality of performance and found that both the doctrines of
international comity254 and act of state required the court to
abide with the Commission's sequestration order.255
The trustee in bankruptcy for Chuidian appealed the deci-
sion to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.256 The trustee ar-
gued that the district court erred in excusing performance
under the letter of credit because of supervening illegality. 7
He relied upon Weltover to support his position that the illegality
defense did not apply because the "place of performance" of the
letter of credit was Los Angeles and not Manila, and therefore,
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. See Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 734 F. Supp. 415 (C.D. Cal. 1990),
aftid, 976 F.2d 561 (1990) (giving district court opinion). The concept of comity was
first articulated in Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895). The Supreme Court in
Hilton defined the principle of comity:
No law has any effect, of its own force, beyond the limits of the sovereignty
from which its authority is derived. The extent to which the law of one nation,
as put in force within its territory, whether by executive order, by legislative
act, or by judicial decree, shall be allowed to operate within the dominion of
another nation, depends upon what our greatest jurists have been content to
call "the comity of nations."
Id. at 163. The concept of comity has been defined more recently in Somportex Ltd. v.
Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 1017 (1972), as the following:
Comity is a recognition which one nation extends within its own territory to
the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another. It is not a rule of law, but
one of practice, convenience, and expediency. Although more than mere
courtesy and accommodation, comity does not achieve the force of an impera-
tive or obligation. Rather, it is a nation's expression of understanding which
demonstrates due regard both to international duty and convenience and to
the rights of persons protected by its own laws. Comity should be withheld
only when its acceptance would be contrary or prejudicial to the interest of the
nation called upon to give it effect.
Id.; see Gregory T. Walters, Comment, Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications Inc.: The
Clash Between Protection of Free Speech in the United States and Great Britain, 16 FoiuAM
INT'L L.J. 895, 914-19 (1992-93) (providing overview of doctrine of comity).
255. Chuidian, 734 F. Supp. 415 (C.D. Cal.), affid, 976 F.2d 561 (1990).
256. Chuidian, 976 F.2d at 561.
257. Id. at 562.
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the execution of the contract should not be excused. 258 He con-
tended that Weltover's holding supported a rule that the place of
performance of a letter of credit included the expected location
of payment. 259 The Ninth Circuit distinguished Weltover, indicat-
ing that the Court in Weltover did not articulate any jurisdictional
guidelines for identifying the place of performance of letters of
credit. 26° According to Judge Jerome Farris, Weltover held that
Argentina's issuance of bonds for purposes of asserting jurisdic-
tion under the FSIA constituted "commercial activity" which had
a "direct effect" in the United States.261
The dissent argued that the majority read Weltover too nar-
rowly.262 According to the dissent, the better rule was that the
"place of performance" of a letter of credit was the intended lo-
cation (or locations) in which it was to be paid. 63 The dissent
emphasized that Chuidian's letter of credit specifically stated a
Los Angeles location, and no other location, as its site of pay-
ment.264 It noted that in both Weltover and the case at hand,
liability for payment remained with the entity in the non-U.S.
jurisdiction, the beneficiaries of the obligations were non-U.S.
nationals, and both the issuer and purchaser of the bonds were
non-U.S. nationals. 65 The dissent further noted that the Repub-
lic of Argentina had even fewer contacts with the forum than the
Exporter had with its forum.2 6 6 The dissent agreed with
Chuidian that a letter of credit should be enforced when the
performance was legal at the place designated for payment but
illegal at the place where the credit was issued.267
258. Id. Chuidian's argument was that the court's conclusion was based on the
premise that the letter of credit was to be performed in the Philippines, and that Philip-
pine law prohibited the bank from performing. Id. at 563. Chuidian therefore argued
that the place for performance was Los Angeles and thus the Commission's order was
insufficient to excuse Philippine's performance. Id.
259. Id. at 563.
260. Id. at 564.
261. Id. The narrow interpretation of Weltover's holding which the majority
adopted was that "Argentina's issuance of bonds was a commercial activity with a direct
effect in the United States for purposes of asserting jurisdiction under the Foreign Sov-
ereign Immunities Act." Id.
262. Id. at 566-67 (Fernandez, J., dissenting).
263. Id. at 565.
264. Id. The dissent analyzed that "[n]o other place of payment was designated.
Moreover, Los Angeles is the place where prior payments had been made." Id.
265. Id. at 566-67.
266. Id. at 567.
267. Id. at 568.
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3. The Second Circuit's Application of the U.S. Supreme
Court's Weltover Standard for Commercial Activity
Lead to Inconsistent Conclusions
The U.S Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently
attempted to apply the standard for "commercial activity" set out
in Weltover.268 The issue in Antares Aircraft v. Federal Republic of
Nigeria concerned the application of the FSIA's commercial ac-
tivity exception to the detention of the plaintiffs aircraft at a
Nigerian airport.269 Judge Ralph Winter, writing for the major-
ity, held that no "direct effect" in the United States existed, and
thus, the "commercial activity" exception did not apply.270 The
majority noted that all legally significant acts had taken place in
Nigeria.271 The majority equated the Antares case with Weltover
by remarking that the payment of funds to the Nigerian authori-
ties had to be in Nigeria, just as the Bonods in Weltover were re-
quired to be paid in New York.272
Judge Frank X. Altimari, dissenting, reached the opposite
conclusion based on Weltover 3 Judge Altimari reasoned that
the plaintiff, being an U.S. partnership, suffered a "direct effect"
in the United States in view of the fact that its plane had been
expropriated by a non-U.S. sovereign.27 4  He inferred from
Weltover that a sovereign's improper commercial acts, similar to
the situation in Weltover, caused a "direct effect" to the plaintiff
in that plaintiffs principal place of business.275 According to the
dissent, if a U.S. firm wanted to recover its plane, which was
seized by a non-U.S. sovereign, it could assert jurisdiction over
that sovereign using the FSIA 6.2 " Therefore, Judge Altimari
opined that the plaintiff should be permitted to use the FSIA's
commercial activity exception in order to be able to sue the Fed-
eral Republic of Nigeria.277
268. Antares Aircraft v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 999 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1993).
269. Id. at 34.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 36.
272. Id. The court explained that "[wiherever the source of the money, payment
had to be in Nigeria, just as the payment in Weltover had to be in New York." Id.
273. Id. at 37 (AltimariJ., dissenting).
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
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4. The Fifth Circuit Reached a Decision by Applying the
U.S. Supreme Court's Weltover Standard for
Commercial Activity
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently ad-
judicated a case resulting from President Corazon Aquino's Pres-
idential Commission on Good Government (the "Commis-
sion.") 271 In Walter Fuller Aircraft Sales, Inc. v. Republic of Philip-
pines, the Commission sequestered a Falcon 50 jet aircraft
("Falcon") that had been leased by a Philippine corporation sus-
pected of having ties to the former Marcos regime.2 79 The Com-
mission sold the Falcon to Walter Fuller Aircraft Sales, Inc.
("Fuller"), a U.S. corporation, which subsequently brought the
jet into the United States. 280 The original owner, Faysound, Ltd.
("Faysound"), a Hong Kong corporation, successfully brought
suit against Fuller in federal district court in Arkansas to gain
good title.281
Fuller sued the Commission in the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Texas to recover the cost of defending
Faysound's lawsuit, claiming that the Commission had promised
to defend any action brought by an adverse claimant to the Fal-
con. 2 2 The Commission moved to dismiss on the ground that it
was entitled to immunity under the FSIA.2 83 The district court
disagreed holding that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the
suit under the commercial activities exception of the FSIA.2 4
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that the district court
properly asserted jurisdiction against the Commission under the
"commercial activities" exception to the FSIA.285 Citing Weltover,
the Fifth Circuit held that an activity is commercial in nature if it
was of the type that a private person would customarily engage in
for profit.28 6 The court used Weltover to support its finding that
the Commission's commercial act caused a "direct effect" in the
278. Walter Fuller Aircraft Sales, Inc. v. Republic of Philippines, 965 F.2d 1375
(5th Cir. 1992).
279. Id. at 1377.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id,
286. Id. at 1384 citing Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., - U.S. -, 112 S. Ct.
2160, 2165-67 (1992).
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United States and therefore the Commission could not be im-
mune from suit.28 7 The Fifth Circuit employed this standard to
reach its finding of commercial activity.2 88 The court noted that
by utilizing the lenient standard in Weltover for determining "di-
rect effect," it "strengthen [ed]" its holding in the case.289
III. WELTOVER: LOOKING TOWARD THE FUTURE
The greatest achievement of the U.S. Supreme Court in Re-
public of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc. has been its ability to assist
courts in settling the ambiguous meaning of the FSIA's commer-
cial exception.2 90  However, as recent decisions demonstrate,
utilizing the Court's holding in Weltover as a guide is often a for-
midable task for courts.291  The Supreme Court has not com-
pletely settled all the confusion due to the ambiguity of the term
"commercial activity." 292 Nevertheless, the impact that Weltover
has had on courts has been influential.
A. The Primay Consequence of the Weltover Decision Has Been to
Assist Courts in Determining Whether the SIA Protects a
Sovereign's Actions
The consequence of the Supreme Court's holding in
Weltover on subsequent case law has been significant. In the first
year following the U.S. Supreme Court holding in Weltover, over
fifteen cases have referred to this decision in their opinions.293
287. Walter Fuller, 965 F.2d at 1384. The Fifth Circuit noted that the Supreme
Court in Weltover had recently approved of the approach that the Fifth Circuit had
adopted which held that an activity had a commercial nature for purposes of FSIA im-
munity if it was of the type that a private person would customarily engage in for profit.
Id.
288. Id. at 1385. The Fifth Circuit observed that if it employed the Texas Trading
test which was adopted in Weltover, there would be little doubt that the sale of the Fal-
con would qualify as commercial activity. Id.
289. Id. at 1387. The court recognized that the decision in Weltover strengthened
its conclusion in the case. Id.
290. See supra notes 69-87 and accompanying text (analyzing judicial interpreta-
tions of commercial activity exception).
291. See supra notes 214-68 and accompanying text (reviewing courts' attempts to
apply Weltover).
292. See Tubular Inspectors, Inc. v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 977 F.2d 180, 180 (5th
Cir. 1992) (lamenting fact that "the task of interpreting the FSIA is no easier now than
it has been before").
293. See, e.g., Antares Aircraft v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, - U.S. -, 112 S. Ct.
3020 (1992) (vacating judgment and remanding to United States Court of Appeals for
Second Circuit for further consideration in light of Republic of Argentina v. Weltover,
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The reaction of the courts to Weltover has generally been one
acknowledging the U.S. Supreme Court for its assistance in inter-
preting a statute that had previously confounded them. 94
In Weltover, the Court prudently rejected a "purpose" analy-
sis, and adopted instead a "nature" analysis, in order to charac-
terize a sovereign's action. 211 The Court's shifting of the focus
from "purpose" to "nature" precluded non-U.S. States from ar-
guing that their activities should be immune based on their non-
commercial objectives.296 One commentator has criticized the
holding in Weltover for failing to focus on Argentina's presiden-
tial decree, which extended the time for paying back the Bo-
nods.297  By neglecting to emphasize the presidential decree,
however, the Court acted consistently with its rejection of a per-
Inc.); Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 976 F.2d 561, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (dissenting
opinion) (following Weltover by saying that "the place of payment is usually considered
the place of performance in analogous situations."); Walter Fuller Aircraft Sales, Inc. v.
Republic of Philippines, 965 F.2d 1375, 1387, (5th Cir. 1992)(noting that "Weltover
strengthens our conclusion.. . ."); Federal Ins. Co. v. Richard I. Rubin & Co., Inc., No.
92-4177, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 784, at *24 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 1993) (concluding that it
could exercise subject matter jurisdiction based upon the commercial activity exception
of the FSIA); Drexel Burnham Lambert Group Inc. v. A.W. Galadari, 810 F. Supp. 1375,
1385-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (relying on Weltover for its interpretation of FSIA's commercial
activity exception); AMPAC Group Inc. v. Republic of Honduras, 797 F. Supp. 973, 976-
77 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (noting that the "very recent Supreme Court decision of Republic of
Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.... disposes of the issue [and]... provides guidance."); First
City, Texas-Houston, N.A. v. Rafidian Bank, No. 90 Civ. 7360, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15235, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 1992) (relying on Weltover for its statement that
"Rafidian Bank's actions were purely commercial in nature. As such, it cannot claim
sovereign immunity for its acts.")
294. See Weltover, - U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2164, The Supreme Court remarked
that the FSIA's definition "leaves the critical term 'commercial' largely undefined." Id.
at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2165; see also Drexel Burnham Lambert Group Inc. v. A.W. Galadari,
810 F. Supp. 1375, 1385 n.15 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (noting that "the FSIA provides almost no
guidance as to the meaning and scope of 'commercial.'"). The court in AMPAC Group
Inc. v. Republic of Honduras, 797 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. Fla. 1992), had to decide whether
defendant's privatizing a national cement industry was an action that was commercial
activity. Id. at 975-78. That court held that the Weltover decision disposed of the issue.
Id. It said that just as in Weltover, the Supreme Court emphasized the "nature" over the
"purpose," so too it would disregard Honduras' motivations and look at the fact that
selling a company is a routine commercial transaction. Id. at 976.
295. See Weltover, - U.S. at - ,112 S. Ct. at 2166; Pizzuro, supra note 99, at 823
(commenting that the Supreme Court's rejection of "purpose" analysis in characteriz-
ing foreign state's actions was "clearly correct"); supra notes 180-95 and accompanying
text (describing Court's reasoning in using nature as opposed to purpose in character-
izing commerciality).
296. See supra note 7 (listing cases which Weltover affected).
297. Pizzuro, supra note 99, at 823. Mr. Pizzuro remarked that the Supreme Court
"neglected to focus on the nature of at least one of the acts giving rise to the claim, i.e.,
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se rule that would render the issuance of debt instruments auto-
matically "commercial." 9 ' The Court did not intend to broaden
the definition of "commercial activity" to encompass every sover-
eign activity, but to include only those acts performed by a sover-
eign that were of the type that a private party engages in when
engaging in commerce.299
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has broadened the
scope of the FSIA's commercial activity exception by interpret-
ing the effect of an act as being "direct" under the FSIA if it was
an immediate consequence of the State's activity.300 The Court
refused to adopt a stricter standard of "substantial" or "foresee-
able" in deciding the "direct effect" issue."' 1 Instead, it adopted
the more lenient standard articulated by the U.S. Court of Ap-
the presidential decree extending the time for repayment of the Bonods." Id.; see also
supra note 105 and accompanying text (discussing Argentina's presidential decree).
298. See Weltover, - U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2167 ("We have no occasion to con-
sider such a per se rule.... ."); Pizzuro, supra note 99, at 823. Mr. Pizzuro commented
that "although the Court was careful to characterize a state's issuance of regulations
limiting foreign currency exchange as sovereign activity, it did not attempt to distin-
guish that case from the presidential decree, which had a similar impact upon other-
wise commercial obligations"; Pizzuro, supra note 99, at 823; see supra notes 196-99 and
accompanying text (discussing Court's handling of Argentina's contention that a "per-
se rule" had been used against them).
299. See Weltover, - U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2166 (concluding that a government's
acts which are in manner of private individual are commercial within meaning of FSIA);
see also testimony of Bruno A. Ristau, Chief of the Foreign Litigation Committee of the
Department of Justice's Civil Division, in Jurisdiction of US. Courts in Suits against Foreign
States: Hearings on HR. 11315 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental
Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciay, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1976) (remarking
that FSIA "is not designed to open up our courts to all corners to litigate any dispute
which any private party may have with a foreign state anywhere in the world").
300. Weltover, - U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2168; see supra note 203 and accompany-
ing text (discussing Court's adoption of the Second Circuit's "immediate consequence"
test); Pizzuro, supra note 99, at 823 observing that:
The Court's holding that an effect in the United States is "direct" within
the meaning of the FSIA as long as it is an immediate consequence of the
foreign state's activity elsewhere could lead to a considerable broadening of
the commercial activity exception to sovereign immunity. Arguably, any
breach by a foreign state of a contractual obligation to be performed in the
United States, regardless of the lack of any other contract between the foreign
state or the transaction and the United States, will support an assertion of
jurisdiction under the FSIA.
Pizzuro, supra note 99, at 823.
301. Weltover, - U.S. at , 112 S. Ct. at 2168. The Supreme Court, in analyzing
the "direct effect" analysis, remarked that it rejects "the suggestion that § 1605(a) (2)
contains any unexpressed requirement of 'substantiality' or 'foreseeability.' As the
Court of Appeals recognized, an effect is 'direct' if it follows 'as an immediate conse-
quence of the defendant's . . . activity.'" Id. (citing Weltover, 941 F.2d at 152). The
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peals for the Second Circuit in Weltover, which focused on
whether the plaintiff has sustained any loss."'2 In doing so, the
Supreme Court in Weltover manifested its desire to remove some
of the barriers that might prevent the United States from assert-
ing jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns. 3 '
In Weltover, the Court focused on the concept that the "di-
rect effect," which is required by the FSIA, need only have a
slight effect in the United States. °4 By adopting a liberal stan-
dard for determining subject matter jurisdiction over U.S. law-
suits brought against non-U.S. governments, the Court indicated
a desire to assert jurisdiction over a greater number of non-U.S.
governments. 30 5 The ultimate effect of Weltover has been to per-
mit U.S. courts to assert jurisdiction over a greater number of
cases involving non-U.S. defendants.30 6 Consequently, non-U.S.
States cannot easily transgress U.S. laws and shield themselves
Court's refusal of these standards indicated its disapproval of the stricter Zernicek stan-
dard. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text (discussing Zernicek).
302. Weltover, 941 F.2d at 152.
303. Walter Fuller Aircraft Sales, Inc. v. Republic of Philippines, 965 F.2d 1375,
1387 (5th Cir. 1992).
304. Weltover, - U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2168; The court in AMPAC Group Inc. v.
Republic of Honduras, 797 F. Supp. 973, 977 (S.D. Fla. 1992) mentioned the Weltover
decision's effect on its decision by explaining that "Weltover therefore teaches that the
effect in the United States need only be slight. Although the effect cannot be specula-
tive, the contact with the United States may indeed be only a tangential one to support
jurisdiction under the FSIA." Id.
305. See, e.g., Neil E. McDonell, Collecting on Iraqi Claims, MIDDLE EAST ExEc. REP.,
June, 1993, at 8 (stating that Supreme Court's Weltover decision adopted lenient stan-
dard for determining subject matter jurisdiction over U.S. lawsuits brought against non-
U.S. governments).
306. See, e.g., Walter Fuller, 965 F.2d 1375. The court in Walter Fuller found that the
defendant's activity caused a direct effect in the United States, and the court com-
mented that Weltover strengthened its holding. Id. at 1387. The court in First City,
Texas-Houston, N.A. v. Rafidian Bank, No. 90 Civ, 7360, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15235
(S.D. N.Y. Sept. 28, 1992) held that based on Weltover, the defendant could not claim
sovereign immunity because its actions were purely commercial in nature. Id. at *10; see
Pizzuro, supra note 99, at 823-24 remarking that the:
Court's definition of direct effect raises the question whether any breach of a
commercial obligation owed by a foreign state to a U.S. corporation could
result in an assertion ofjurisdiction over the foreign state in the United States,
regardless of the place of performance, on the theory that a corporation ex-
periences the effects of a financial injury at its domicile or place of incorpora-
tion.
Pizzuro, supra note 99, at 823-24. Similarly, the court in Rubin held that under the
Weltover standard, their defendant's conduct must have constituted a "direct effect in
the United States." Federal Ins. Co. v. Richard I. Rubin & Co., Inc., No. 92-4177, 1993
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 784, at *24 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 1993).
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from suit via the FSIA.30 7
The Supreme Court's decision in Weltover was a crucial fac-
tor in assisting the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Wal-
ter Fuller with interpreting the "commercial activity" exception of
the FSIA. 08 In Walter Fuller Aircraft Sales, Inc. v. Republic of Philip-
pines, the Fifth Circuit examined the FSIA and its "commercial
activity" exception in detail.3 °9 The Fifth Circuit analyzed the
method of using "nature" over "purpose" to characterize the
commerciality of activities. °10 In approving this test, the Fifth
Circuit noted that it was the accepted approach and relied on
the fact that the Supreme Court in Weltover had similarly ap-
proved of the "nature" standard.31' Absent the FSIA's require-
ment that courts focus on the type of transaction rather than its
parties, the commercial activity exception would be rendered in-
effective, because every government would conjure a sovereign
"purpose" for conduct that is commercial in nature. 1 2 Further-
more, the Fifth Circuit, confronting the "direct effect" test, re-
jected the Zernicek v. Brown & Root, Inc. standard of "foreseeabil-
ity."313 The Fifth Circuit implied that it chose to reject the Zer-
nicek standard because the Court in Weltover also rejected it. 14
The Fifth Circuit in Walter Fuller alluded to the significance of
the Supreme Court's decision in Weltover by completing its "di-
307. See supra note 3 (enumerating exceptions to FSIA that preclude a State's de-
fense of sovereign immunity). The Court's holding in Weltover is important for yet an-
other reason. By expanding the definition of "commercial activity," the Court has
made the American rule concerning public debt litigation consistent with rules in other
financial centers such as those in the United Kingdom and Switzerland. Delaume,
supra note 166, at 1221. These countries regard financial transactions involving other
sovereigns as commercial acts. Id. Some differences do, however, exist. For example,
in the United Kingdom, there need not be a nexus of the commercial activity to the
property claim that the suit is based upon. LEwis, supra note 11, at 86. This element
contrasts with the standard set forth by the FSIA that requires that the property claim
be used for the commercial activity upon which the claim is based. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1610(a) (2) (stating that a sovereign's exception to immunity would be if "the prop-
erty is or was used for the commercial activity upon which the claim is based").
308. See supra notes 278-89 and accompanying text (discussing Walter Fuller case).
309. Walter Fuller, 965 F.2d at 1375-90.
310. Id. at 1384.
311. Id.
312. See, e.g., Commercial Exception, supra note 1, at I ("The importance of this dis-
tinction cannot be overemphasized. Otherwise every government could find an ulti-
mate public or 'sovereign' purpose for even the most clearly commercial conduct.").
313. Walter Fuller, 965 F.2d at 1386-87; see supra notes 69-77 and accompanying text
(discussing Zernicek and foreseeability standard).
314. Walter Fuller, 965 F.2d at 1387.
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rect effect" analysis with the remark that Weltover had reinforced
its conclusion.3 15 The Fifth Circuit's decision in Walter Fuller pro-
vides further evidence for the notion that the decision in
Weltover has had a significant impact on the ability of lower
courts to determine the existence of "commercial activity."
3 16
B. The Weltover Decision Does Not Completely Resolve the Scope of
the Commercial Activity Exception to the FSIA
The holding by the Supreme Court in Weltover was intended
to resolve two issues.31 7 First, it attempted to provide a standard
for commercial activity.318 Second, it dealt with the issue of in-
terpreting the "direct effect" requirement of the FSIA.319 De-
spite the Supreme Court's attempt to resolve these issues, subse-
quent cases have indicated that these two issues still present diffi-
culty for federal courts and even for the Supreme Court.
20
One good example of the lack of specific directive in
Weltover became manifest in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit's split in Chuidian v. Philippine National Bank.3 2' In
Chuidian, Judge Jerome Farris, writing for the majority, distin-
guished Weltover from Chuidian by noting that Weltover did not
articulate a rule to identify the place of performance of letters of
credit, and therefore was inapplicable to its case. 22 Judge Ferdi-
nand F. Fernandez' dissent, however, did not agree with this dis-
tinction. 23 The dissent concluded from Weltover that the place
315. Id. ("If anything, Weltover strengthens our conclusion in this case.").
316. Id.
317. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., - U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 2160, 2167.
318. See supra notes 170-99 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's
handling of commerciality question in Weltover decision).
319. See supra notes 200-08 and accompanying text (discussing Weltover Court's in-
terpretation of "direct effect").
320. See, e.g., Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, - U.S. -, 113 S. Ct. 1471 (1993); Chuidian
v. Philippine Nat. Bank, 976 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1992).
321. 976 F.2d 561. For a discussion of Chuidian, see supra notes 241-67 and accom-
panying text. For another example of Weltover's inability to completely resolve the com-
mercial activity issue, see Intercontinental Dictionary Series v. De Gruyter, 822 F. Supp.
662, 676 (C.D. Cal. 1993) ("The facts of the present matter offer no simple resolution
of the 'commercial activity' analysis and render the identification of the nature of the
activity more problematic than the examples [Weltover and Nelson] presented to the
Court.").
322. Chuidian, 976 F.2d at 564; see supra notes 260-62 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing how the majority distinguishes Weltover).
323. Chuidian, 976 F.2d at 565.
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of payment did constitute the place of performance.3 2 4 The dis-
sent reached this conclusion by comparing the facts of Weltover
to those of Chuidian.325 The inability of the Ninth Circuit to
reach a unanimous opinion in this case indicates that the scope
of Weltover lacks clarity.326
Similarly, in Antares Aircraft v. Federal Republic of Nigeria,32 7
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit adjudicated a case
that manifested the lack of clarity in the Supreme Court's
Weltover decision. In Antares the Second Circuit considered a
case that had been remanded to it by the Supreme Court for
further consideration in light of the Weltover holding.3 28 The is-
sue in Antares concerned specifically the application of the "di-
rect effect" prong of the FSIA's commercial activity exception to
the detention of the plaintiff's aircraft at a Nigerian airport.129
The majority opinion in Antares held that no "direct effect" in
the United States existed, and thus, the "commercial activity" ex-
ception did not apply3 30 The majority noted that all legally sig-
nificant acts had taken place in Nigeria. 331 The majority relied
on the Supreme Court's opinion in Weltover for its finding of a
lack of the requisite "direct effect."332 It equated the Antares case
with Weltover by remarking that the payment of funds to the
Nigerian authorities had to be in Nigeria, just as the Bonods in
Weltover were required to be paid in New York. 3
Judge Altimari, dissenting, reached the opposite conclusion
based on Weltover.33 4 He found that the plaintiff had suffered a
"direct effect" in the United States.335 The dissent's reasoning
324. Id. at 566.
325. Id.; see supra notes 263-68 and accompanying text (discussing reasons for dis-
senting opinion in Chuidian).
326. See supra notes 241-67 (discussing majority and dissenting opinions in
Chuidian).
327. 999 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1993); see supra notes 268-77 and accompanying text
(discussing Second Circuit's opinion in Antares).
328. Antares, 999 F.2d at 33; see supra note 7 (mentioning Supreme Court's deci-
sion to remand).
329. Antares, 999 F.2d at 34.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 36.
332. Id.
333. Id. ("Wherever the source of the money, payment had to be in Nigeria, just as
the payment in Weltover had to be in New York.").
334. Id. at 37 (Altimari, J., dissenting).
335. Id.
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focused on the fact that the plaintiff, a U.S. company, had its
plane expropriated by a non-U.S. sovereign. 336 Like the major-
ity, the dissent compared the case to the facts in Weltover. 37 He
implied from Weltover that a sovereign's improper commercial
acts, similar to the situation in Weltover, caused a "direct effect"
to the plaintiff in that plaintiffs principal place of business. 38
The dissent, unlike the majority, focused on whether the plain-
tiff was being injured in the United States in order to determine
the existence of a "direct effect" in the United States.339 There-
fore, according to the dissent, if a U.S. firm wanted to recover its
plane which was seized by a non-U.S. sovereign, it suffered a "di-
rect effect" in the United States, and thus, it could assertjurisdic-
tion over that sovereign using the FSIA. 4 ° Consequently, the
dissent held that the plaintiff should be permitted to use the
FSIA's commercial activity exception in order to be able to sue
the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 41
The splintered verdict in Saudi Arabia v. Nelson,342 a recent
U.S. Supreme Court case that followed Weltover, is indicative of
the magnitude of remaining ambiguity that exists regarding the
commercial exception of the FSIA. In Nelson, the Court once
again confronted the enigmatic commercial exception of the
FSIA.3 43 Its split opinion indicates the trouble that the Court has
with its earlier definition of the FSIA's commercial exception.344
The Court could not agree on whether an action brought by a
U.S. plaintiff, who had suffered personal injuries as a result of
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. - U.S. -, 113 S. Ct. 1471 (1993); see supra notes 214-40 and accompanying
text (discussing Nelson). Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor, Scalia and Thomas joined, and in
which Justice Kennedyjoined except for the last paragraph of Part II. - U.S. at __, 113
S. Ct. at 1473. Justice White filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which
Justice Blackmunjoined. Id. Justice Blackmun filed an opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part. Id. Justice Kennedy filed an opinion concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part, in which Justices Blackmun and Stevens joined as to Parts I-B and II. Id.
Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion. Id. Contrast this highly splintered argument
with the unanimous opinion handed down in Weltover some nine months earlier.
Weltover, - U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2160.
343. Nelson, - U.S. at -, 113 S. Ct. at 1471.
344. Id. at , 113 S. Ct. at 1471-88.
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the Saudi Government's unlawful detention and torture, was
based upon a commercial activity within the meaning of the
FSIA.3 45 The majority held that unlike Argentina's activities in
Weltover, the Saudi Government's wrongful arrest, imprisonment
and torture of Nelson did not constitute "commercial activity."346
Justice Stevens dissent, however, opined that the Saudi Govern-
ment's operation of the hospital did constitute "commercial ac-
tivity."347 This manifestation of Weltover's lack of a crystalline so-
lution to all questions of existence of "commercial activity" is fur-
ther bolstered in light of the fact thatJustices Stevens, White and
Blackmun, who all held in Nelson that the Saudi Government's
actions did not constitute commercial activity, unanimously
agreed with the other five justices in Weltover that Argentina's
actions did constitute "commercial activity."348
C. The Weltover Decision Provides Lower Courts with the Most
Useful Standard Possible
The Supreme Court's holding in Weltover attempted to clar-
ify the long standing ambiguity that accompanied the commer-
cial activity exception. Unfortunately, due to the myriad of pos-
sible scenarios that can present issues of the existence of "com-
mercial activity" within the meaning of the FSIA, it does not lend
itself to simple explanation. Therefore, the Supreme Court
lacked the ability to formulate a solution that would provide easy
answers for every "commercial activity" question that would arise
in the future.
The Court's valiant attempt to clarify the definition of "com-
merciality" within the meaning of the FSIA deserves recognition
for the clearer alternative that it has provided for lower courts to
follow. 349 Due to the nature of the issue which the Supreme
Court set out to resolve, namely that of providing a standard for
345. Id.
346. Id. at ., 113 S. Ct. at 1479 ("Unlike Argentina's activities that we considered
in Weltover, the intentional conduct alleged here . . .could not qualify as commercial
under the restrictive theory.).
347. Id. at -, 113 S. Ct. at 1488 (StevensJ. dissenting) ("[P]etitioner's operation
of the hospital and its employment practices and disciplinary procedures are 'commer-
cial activities' within the meaning of the statute. .. ").
348. See supra notes 218-40 (discussing various opinions in Nelson); Weltover, __ U.S.
at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2160.
349. See supra note 7 (giving examples of cases that have used the Weltover decision
as support for their holdings).
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determining commerciality within the meaning of the FSIA, it
was inevitable that it would fail to provide the perfect solution.
It would not have been possible to define "commercial activity"
with such precision that debate on the issue would cease.
CONCLUSION
The U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Republic of Argentina v.
Weltover, Inc. attempted to resolve the interpretation of the
FSIA's commercial exception due to the lack of clarity and direc-
tive within the FSIA. The Court's liberal interpretation of what
constitutes a "direct effect" in the U.S. has simplified matters for
the judiciary. Although the consequence of the decision has
been to provide some degree of guidance to courts, decisions
following Weltover, such as those of Chuidian v. Philippine National
Bank, and the Supreme Court's split in Saudi Arabia v. Nelson,
indicate the absence of absolute directive for future court opin-
ions, especially in cases which contain both elements of com-
merciality and those concerning sovereign functions. The
Supreme Court's attempt at solving the "commercial activity" ex-
ception ambiguity was the clearest standard that it could have
provided for lower courts to follow.
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